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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE:
ELDRED v. ASHCROFT GETS IT RIGHT

CRAIG W. DALLON*
In Eldred v. Ashcroft1 the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality
of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 (the “CTEA”)2 and
was called upon to construe the scope of power granted to Congress by Article
I, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution (the “Copyright Clause”).3 Many
scholars were surprised that the Court had granted certiorari in the case.4 The
case generated no fewer than thirty-four amicus curiae briefs from interest
groups and individuals on both sides of the case,5 and spawned numerous law
review articles while it was pending.6
Many scholars and advocates for the public domain hoped that the
Supreme Court in Eldred would find in the Copyright Clause meaningful
limitations on the power of Congress to confer financial benefits on copyright

* Associate Professor of Law, Creighton University School of Law. I wish to thank Joshua
Willmott and Natalie Polzer for their research assistance with this article.
1. 537 U.S. 186 (2003). The case was argued on October 9, 2002, and decided January 15,
2003. Id.
2. Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827.
3. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries”).
4. This may be putting it mildly. Professor Hugh C. Hansen stated: “I do not know anyone
on either side of the debate who thought that certiorari would be granted. When the Court
granted certiorari, people were dumbstruck.” Symposium: Panel II, Mickey Mice? Potential
Ramifications of Eldred v. Ashcroft, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 771, 776–
77 (2003).
5. See U.S. Supreme Court docket No. 01-618, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/01618.htm (listing briefs). This number does not include the amicus briefs filed in connection with
the petition for certiorari. See id.
6. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Dubious Constitutionality of the Copyright Term
Extension Act, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 123 (2002); Orrin G. Hatch & Thomas R. Lee, “To Promote
the Progress of Science”: The Copyright Clause and Congress’s Power to Extend Copyrights, 16
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2002); Tyler T. Ochoa & Mark Rose, The Anti-monopoly Origins of the
Patent and Copyright Clause, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 675 (2002); Symposium: Panel II,
supra note 4.
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holders without providing any corresponding benefit to the public.7 The
petitioners and others hoped for a bold, landscape-altering decision. They did
not get it. Instead, the Court afforded Congress substantial discretion in
adopting copyright legislation and refused to find significant limits in the “To
promote the Progress of Science” or “for limited Times” language of the
clause.
Since Eldred, some scholars have decried what they perceive as the
Court’s abrogation of its constitutional role to give meaning to the Copyright
Clause and operate as an effective check on the legislative branch.8 Others
believe that the Court’s holding was correct.9 This Article takes the position
that, regardless of the merits of the CTEA itself,10 the Court correctly
determined that Congress had the power to enact the CTEA, including the
retroactive extension of the term for existing copyrights. The Framers and
ratifiers of the Constitution likely did not intend for the Copyright Clause to be
construed to impose the limits urged by opponents of the CTEA, nor would
they have viewed the Copyright Clause as a vehicle for the courts to strike
down copyright legislation retroactively extending copyright terms. This
Article will evaluate Eldred using originalist and textualist approaches to
constitutional interpretation.11
Part I of this Article will discuss the rationale and holding of Eldred. Part
II will consider the meaning of the text of the Copyright Clause and suggest
that the clause is first and foremost a grant of power to establish an effective
copyright system with only modest limits on the exercise of congressional
7. See Pamela Samuelson, The Constitutional Law of Intellectual Property After Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 547, 548 (2003) (noting “substantial consensus” among
intellectual property scholars that CTEA is unconstitutional).
8. See, e.g., Edward C. Walterscheid, Musings on the Copyright Power: A Critique of
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 14 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 309 (2004); William Patry, The United States and
International Copyright Law: From Berne to Eldred, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 749, 755–58 (2003); L.
Ray Patterson, What’s Wrong with Eldred? An Essay on Copyright Jurisprudence, 10 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 345, 349 (2003).
9. See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz & William Michael Treanor, Essay, Eldred and Lochner:
Copyright Term Extension and Intellectual Property As Constitutional Property, 112 YALE L.J.
2331 (2003).
10. On balance, the CTEA was bad policy; it served the private interests of a few copyright
holders to the detriment of the public. See Craig W. Dallon, The Problem with Congress and
Copyright Law: Forgetting the Past and Ignoring the Public Interest, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
365 (2004) (arguing that the CTEA is inconsistent with the historical purposes of copyright
protection and elevated the interest of a few copyright holders above the public interest).
11. The Eldred petitioners and the Court both used these modes of interpretation. See Eldred
v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 199 (2003) (relying upon “[t]ext, history, and precedent” in its
analysis); Brief for Petitioners at 14, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618)
(stating that argument was based on the “text, structure and original meaning of the Copyright
Clause”).
For a discussion of the modalities of interpretation, see PHILIP BOBBITT,
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 9–38 (1982).
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power. Part III will suggest that limited judicial review for constitutionality of
copyright enactments is consistent with Supreme Court precedent and the
intention of the Framers. Part IV will identify problems with the Eldred
decision and suggest that the Court unnecessarily placed greater emphasis on
private interests of copyright holders at the expense of the public interest. It
will also disagree with the Court’s analysis of the “quid pro quo” argument and
will question the Court’s historical rationale. Part V will conclude that the
Supreme Court appropriately affirmed Congress’s power to enact the CTEA.
I. THE HOLDING AND RATIONALE OF ELDRED V. ASHCROFT
Eldred v. Ashcroft,12 for the first time before the Supreme Court, squarely
presented an issue concerning the constitutionality of copyright terms. In
earlier decisions the Supreme Court had considered whether works qualified
for copyright protection13 and whether works had passed into the public
domain,14 but Eldred was the first case to question the authority of Congress to
extend copyright terms.
In Eldred, the petitioners argued that the CTEA, enacted in 1998, was
unconstitutional. The CTEA extended the terms of existing and future
copyrights by twenty years. Prior to the CTEA, under the Copyright Act of
1976 (the “1976 Act”), generally the term for copyrights was the life of the
author plus fifty years.15 For works made for hire, anonymous works, and
pseudonymous works, the term was the earlier of seventy-five years from the
year of its first publication or one hundred years from its creation. The CTEA
extended those copyright terms by twenty years to the life of the author plus
seventy years, or for works made for hire, anonymous works, and
pseudonymous works, the earlier of ninety-five years from publication or one
hundred twenty years from creation.16
12. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
13. E.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903) (holding circus
advertisements subject to copyright protection); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111
U.S. 53 (1884) (holding photograph qualified for copyright protection); Wheaton v. Peters, 33
U.S. 591 (1834) (holding strict conformance with statute required for copyright protection).
14. See Am. Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284 (1907) (holding public display of
painting at exhibit did not constitute general publication placing work beyond reach of copyright
protection); Mifflin v. Dutton, 190 U.S. 265 (1903) (holding Harriet Beecher Stowe’s work, the
“Minister’s Wooing,” had passed into the public domain for failure to satisfy the notice
requirement). For leading circuit court decisions, see, e.g., Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc.
v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 1999) (deciding whether Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s “I
Have a Dream” speech passed into the public domain); Hasbro Bradley, Inc. v. Sparkle Toys,
Inc., 780 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1985) (deciding whether failure to place required copyright notice on
toys could be cured to afford copyright protection).
15. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193 (citing Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat.
2541).
16. Id.
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The petitioners in the lower courts argued that the CTEA was
unconstitutional as it concerned term extensions for both existing and future
copyrights.17 Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners limited their argument
to the constitutionality of the extension of existing copyrights (retroactive term
extensions); they did not challenge the constitutionality of copyright term
extension for future works (prospective term extensions).18 The petitioners
argued that under an intermediate scrutiny analysis, copyright extension
violated the First Amendment.19 The petitioners’ other arguments spoke
directly to the text and meaning of the Copyright Clause itself; they claimed
that the CTEA violated the “limited Times” requirement because retroactive
extension was not “limited,” did not “promote the Progress of Science,” and
violated an implied quid pro quo requirement.20 This Article will focus on the
Copyright Clause issues and will only briefly summarize the First Amendment
argument.
The First Amendment argument did not get much traction at any level of
the litigation.21 The district court spent barely three sentences rejecting the
argument, relying upon District of Columbia Circuit precedent holding that
“there are no First Amendment rights to use the copyrighted works of
others.”22 The argument received greater attention in the circuit court decision,
but an equally strong rebuke. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit held that prior precedents stood “as insuperable bars” to
plaintiffs’ argument, and reaffirmed its holding that “copyrights are
categorically immune from challenges under the First Amendment.”23 The
Court of Appeals emphasized that the copyright doctrines of the
idea/expression dichotomy and fair use already afford adequate protection for
free speech.24

17. See Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2001), aff’d sub nom. Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
18. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 218 n.23 (2003). “Petitioners originally framed [the First
Amendment] argument as implicating the CTEA’s extension of both existing and future
copyrights,” but narrowed the argument on appeal to the Supreme Court. Id.; see also id. at 198
(stating questions for which certiorari was granted).
19. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 11, at 11.
20. Id. at 10.
21. William Patry is of the view that “[i]n truth, there never was a claimed First Amendment
violation,” but rather an effort to get the Court to apply First Amendment strict scrutiny to an
alleged Copyright Clause violation. Patry, supra note 8, at 758.
22. Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1999), aff’d, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001),
aff’d sub nom. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
23. Eldred, 239 F.3d at 375.
24. Id. at 376.
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Like the lower courts, the Supreme Court did not dwell long on the First
Amendment argument.25 The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of
Appeals’ view that copyright law’s “built-in First Amendment
accommodations,” namely the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use, already
afford adequate protection for First Amendment considerations26 and refused
to impose heightened scrutiny on the CTEA.27 The Supreme Court found
significant that the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment were both
adopted close in time, indicating that the Framers saw these two constitutional
provisions as compatible.28 The Court held that the First Amendment “bears
less heavily when speakers assert the right to make other people’s speeches.”29
The Court, however, did disavow the circuit court’s overly broad statement
that copyrights were “categorically immune from challenges under the First
Amendment.”30
The Court also rejected the petitioners’ Copyright Clause claims. These
claims focused on the “limited Times” language and the “To promote the
Progress of Science” language.31 The heart of the petitioners’ argument was
that Congress exceeded its constitutionally granted authority under the
Copyright Clause when it enacted retroactive copyright term extensions.
The petitioners argued that the CTEA retroactive extension of the term of
existing copyrights violated the constitutional requirement that copyrights be
granted for limited times.32 Petitioners argued that the CTEA retroactive
extension was, in essence, a step toward perpetual copyright.33 The Court
responded that a copyright term for the life of the author plus seventy years is a
copyright for a limited time (petitioners essentially conceded as much).34 The
Court looked to Constitution-era dictionary definitions of the word “limited”
25. The Court handled the analysis of the First Amendment argument in six paragraphs
covering about three pages. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 218–21. By contrast, the Copyright Clause
analysis covered about nineteen pages. See id. at 199–218.
26. Id. at 219.
27. Id. at 218–19.
28. Id. at 219; cf. 16 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION 379, 386 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1986) [hereinafter 16 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF RATIFICATION] (Norfolk & Portsmouth J., by “Marcus” (James Iredell), dated Mar.
12, 1788). James Iredell, later Justice of the Supreme Court, arguing for ratification of the
Constitution, wrote that the Copyright Clause did not impede liberty of the press; “surely such an
encouragement to genius is no restraint on the liberty of the press.” Id.
29. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 197.
32. Id. at 208.
33. Id.; Brief for Petitioners, supra note 11, at 18–19.
34. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 199; see also Brief for Petitioners, supra note 11, at 14 (arguing that
“[w]hether 50 years is enough, or 70 years too much, is not a judgment meet for this Court”); id.
(stating that “[t]he line between prospective and retrospective extensions is a clear one”)
(emphases added).
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and easily found that the extended term continued to be limited—“‘confine[d]
within certain bounds,’ ‘restrain[ed],’ or ‘circumscribe[d].’”35 Nothing in the
text of the CTEA creates a perpetual copyright.36 Moreover, the Court found
no intention by Congress to create perpetual copyrights.37 Given that a
copyright in a future work lasting for the life of the author plus seventy years is
for a limited time, it is a small step—if a step at all—to find that extending the
term of an existing copyright resulting in the same term is a term for a limited
time.
As confirmation of no violation of the limited times requirement, the Court
relied heavily upon the historical practice of various congresses in granting
retroactive copyright extensions. “History reveals an unbroken congressional
practice of granting to authors of works with existing copyrights the benefit of
term extensions so that all under copyright protection will be governed
evenhandedly under the same regime.”38 The Court also pointed to a history of
retroactive patent extensions and decisions approving such extensions as
evidence that the Copyright Clause in no way forecloses retroactive
extensions.39 Article I, section 8, clause 8, referred to here as the Copyright
Clause, is also sometimes referred to as the Intellectual Property Clause or the
Patent Clause40 because this same clause also authorizes Congress to extend
patent protection.41
The Court also rejected the petitioners’ claim that the extension failed to
promote the progress of science. The Court emphasized that Congress enjoys
broad discretion in determining how best to promote the progress of science by
affording copyright protection.42 The Court found that the CTEA promoted
the progress of science and satisfied the rational basis test by harmonizing
United States copyright law with European Union (EU) copyright law and
providing greater incentives for creation and dissemination of works in the
United States.43 The Court rejected the argument that the retroactive extension
failed to satisfy a perceived constitutionally mandated quid pro quo
35. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 199 (alterations in original) (quoting S. JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF
ed. 1785)).
36. Id. at 209 n.16. “[Justice Breyer] does not identify any statement in the statutory text
that installs a perpetual copyright for there is none.” Id.
37. Id. at 199–200, 209.
38. Id. at 200.
39. Id. at 201–04.
40. See, e.g., TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 35 (2001) (not
reaching the “Patent Clause” issue); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav.
Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 635–37, 636 n.4 (1999) (discussing and quoting the “Patent Clause”); United
States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp.2d 1111, 1137 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (referring to the “Intellectual
Property Clause”).
41. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 201.
42. Id. at 212–13.
43. Id. at 205–07.
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (7th
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exchange—a copyright in exchange for creation of a work.44 The Court
accepted, for argument’s sake, the contention that a quid pro quo requirement
existed, but found that authors created their works in exchange for copyright
protection with an expectation that they would also be entitled to future
copyright extensions.45
II. THE MEANING OF THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE: FOREMOST, A GRANT OF
AUTHORITY
A.

Empowering Congress

In Eldred, the Court allowed Congress substantial deference to define the
contours of copyright protection. “As we read the Framers’ instruction, the
Copyright Clause empowers Congress to determine the intellectual property
regimes that, overall, in that body’s judgment, will serve the ends of the
Clause.”46 The Court, recognizing its role, refused to “second-guess”
Congress.47 The Court’s deference and the outcome in Eldred comport with
the language and intent of the Copyright Clause; the Clause, above all, was
intended to grant Congress authority to create a copyright scheme and not to
impose limits upon copyright interests.
Any constitutional analysis must begin with the language of the
Constitution itself. The Copyright Clause states that Congress has the power to
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries . . . .”48 Little is known about the drafting of the
precise language of the Copyright Clause. In the Constitutional Convention
there was no recorded discussion of the meaning of the clause; it was adopted
unanimously and without controversy. 49 Proposed language for the clause was
introduced at the Constitutional Convention by both James Madison and
Charles Pinckney.50 Copyright, however, was already a familiar concept to the
Framers. The famous English copyright statute, the Statute of Anne of 1710,51
was well known to the Framers.52 Moreover, the Continental Congress in 1783
44. Id. at 214–15.
45. Id.
46. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 222.
47. Id.
48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
49. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 505–15 (Max Farrand ed.,
rev. ed in four vols., 1966) [hereinafter 2 CONVENTION RECORDS].
50. Id. at 324–25.
51. Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
52. The preamble to the Copyright Act of 1790 clearly drew upon the language of the
preamble of the Statute of Anne of 1710. See 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN
LAW 307 (1st ed. 1826) (noting that the Copyright Act of 1790 was taken generally from the
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passed a resolution encouraging the states to adopt copyright laws.53 James
Madison was one of the three members of the committee in the Continental
Congress who reported on the copyright resolution as it was adopted.54
Between 1783 and 1786, all the states except Delaware passed their own
respective copyright laws.55
The Copyright Clause is unambiguously a grant of power. The text of the
clause communicates the Framers’ intent to give Congress the power to
provide protection to authors for their writings (and inventors for their
discoveries). This understanding of the clause is confirmed by
contemporaneous events and statements. Just prior to the Constitutional
Convention, Madison complained that one of the problems with the
government under the Articles of Confederation was the “want of uniformity in
the laws concerning naturalization & literary property.”56 In May 1783, when
Congress passed its resolution on copyright protection, it did not have the
power to impose a national copyright law, but instead was reduced to
“recommend[] to the several states, to secure to the authors or publishers of
any new books not hitherto printed . . . the copy right of such books.”57
During the debates for ratification of the Constitution, the Framers and
ratifiers echoed the same theme—that the individual states were incapable of
effectively protecting literary property. Madison, in The Federalist No. 43,
justified granting the power to protect authors and inventors under the
Copyright and Patent Clause by observing that “[t]he states cannot separately
make effectual provision for either of the cases.”58 Prominent founder Thomas
McKean,59 in debates over ratification before the Pennsylvania Convention,
argued the same point: “[T]he power of securing to authors and inventors the

Statute of Anne); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (noting that
the Framers understood the nature of copyright and surely were aware of the then-recent
controversy in England concerning the Statute of Anne and common law copyrights).
53. 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 326–27 (Gaillard Hunt
ed., 1922) (reporting text of resolution) [hereinafter 24 JOURNALS].
54. Id. at 326.
55. See COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS: LAWS PASSED IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1783
RELATING TO COPYRIGHT 21 (Copyright Office ed., Bulletin No. 3, rev. 1963) [hereinafter
COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS].
56. Observations by J.M., II MADISON PAPERS 109, vol. XII, 53 (1787), reprinted in 4
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1786–
1870, at 126, 128 (1905).
57. 24 JOURNALS, supra note 53, at 326–27.
58. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 222 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., Gideon ed. 2001).
59. Thomas McKean (also seen as M’Kean) was a signor of the Declaration of
Independence, President of the Continental Congress, Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, and Governor of Pennsylvania. See BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
CONGRESS 1774–1996, 1490–91 (Joel D. Treese ed., 1997).
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exclusive right to their writings and discoveries could only with effect be
exercised by the Congress.”60 Roger Sherman, himself an important member
of the Constitutional Convention and an active participant in the ratification
debates in Connecticut, wrote in the Connecticut Courant that the new power
vested in the United States “for promoting the progress of science,” among
other powers, “appear[ed] to be necessary for the common benefit of the states
and could not be effectually provided for by the particular states.”61
The clause was not a reaction to existing monopolies,62 nor was it an effort
to restrict or limit existing copyrights. Instead, the clause was to make clear
that the national government had the power to enact copyright (and patent)
laws. This purpose can be contrasted with the purpose behind the Statute of
Anne, which was drafted with the dual purposes of allowing copyright
protection but also limiting the Stationers’ book monopoly.63 Admittedly, the
grant of authority does carry with it some implicit limitations on congressional
power, but these limitations on their face and by design are modest as will
appear below.64
B.

“To promote the Progress of Science”
1.

Phrase As Part of the Substantive Grant of Power

Some commentators, in an effort to breathe life into what sometimes has
been characterized as the “preambular” language of the Copyright Clause, have
maintained that the language “To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts” is part of the power-granting language. 65 Judge Sentelle took this
position in his dissent in the Court of Appeals decision in Eldred.66 Taking the
argument a step further, this granting language imposes corresponding

60. 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 415
(Merrill Jensen ed., 1976) [hereinafter 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF RATIFICATION].
61. 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 525
(Merrill Jensen ed., 1978) [hereinafter 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF RATIFICATION].
62. See Thomas B. Nachbar, Constructing Copyright’s Mythology, 6 GREEN BAG 2d 37, 43–
44 (2002).
63. See Dallon, supra note 10, at 403–09 (discussing purposes of the Statute of Anne and
efforts to limit Stationers’ monopoly).
64. See infra notes 215–65 and accompanying text.
65. Edward C. Walterscheid, The Preambular Argument: The Dubious Premise of Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 44 IDEA: THE J. OF LAW & TECH. 331, 332–34 (2004) (arguing that the “To promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts” language is a grant of power, not merely a preamble);
Lawrence B. Solum, Congress’s Power to Promote the Progress of Science: Eldred v. Ashcroft,
36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 22 (2002) (arguing that the “to promote” language is a grant of power
and finding the argument that the clause consists of a preamble followed by a power grant
“unsustainable”).
66. Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 381 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (arguing that the Clause “is a grant
of a power to promote progress”), aff’d sub nom. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
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limitations on congressional power.67
Under this view, Congress is
empowered to legislate in the areas of copyrights and patents only if the
particular legislation in some way promotes the progress of science or the
useful arts.
The “preamble” argument embraced by the court of appeals in Eldred was
that the language “To promote the Progress of Science” was merely a
statement of purpose and itself placed no substantive limit on Congress’s
legislative power.68 The court of appeals claimed that the preambular language
was not part of the substantive grant of power.69 The precedent the court of
appeals relied upon, however, did not go so far. In Schnapper v. Foley,70 relied
upon by the court, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that
the “purposive” or “introductory phrase” of the Copyright Clause did not
constitute a substantive limit on Congress’s legislative power.71 It did not hold
that the language was not part of the grant of power. In fact, the Schnapper
court cited Nimmer on Copyright for the proposition that the introductory
phrase, rather than limiting Congress’s authority, “has for the most part tended
to expand such authority.”72
The Supreme Court, without expressly embracing or disavowing the
preamble argument, acknowledged the circuit court’s position73 and the
petitioners’ concession74 that the preamble was not a substantive limit on
Congress’s power. Instead of expressly rejecting the preamble argument, the
Court found that the CTEA arguably did “promote[] the Progress of Science”75
by harmonizing American copyright law with EU law and encouraging
investment in restoration and public distribution of works.76
The phrase “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts” should
be considered part of the granting language of the clause, but should neither be
viewed as a general grant of authority to promote the progress of science by

67. See Walterscheid, supra note 65, at 359–60 (finding “the ‘to promote’ language of the
Clause is more than merely a statement of purpose; it is both a general grant of power and a
constitutional limitation on the authority granted to Congress with respect to patents and
copyrights”).
68. See Eldred, 239 F.3d at 378.
69. Id. (stating that “the Court in Feist [Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,
499 U.S. 340 (1991)] never suggests that the preamble informs its interpretation of the
substantive grant of power to the Congress”).
70. 667 F.2d 102 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
71. Id. at 111–12.
72. Id. at 111 (citing 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03(B)). The latest edition of Nimmer on
Copyright continues to hold to that view. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[B] (2005).
73. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 197 (2003).
74. Id. at 211.
75. Id. at 213.
76. Id. at 205–07.
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any means nor as a limitation on Congress’s copyright power. The phrase
could be considered “introductory” only in the sense that it is the opening or
beginning phrase of the clause.77 That label in no way detracts from the legal
significance of the phrase. Whether the phrase is fairly characterized as
“preambular” is a closer call. A preamble is defined as:
1: an introductory part (as to a book, document): introduction, preface; specif :
the introductory part of a statute . . . that states the reasons and intent of the
law . . . or is used for other explanatory purposes (as to recite facts knowledge
of which is necessary to an understanding of the law or to define or limit the
meanings of words used in the law) . . . .78

The phrase does communicate the reasons and intent of the law, but it is not
limited to an introductory or explanatory role. The phrase on its face is an
adjective phrase directly describing the power granted. The phrase beginning
“by securing,” in turn, modifies “to promote.” The “to promote” phrase is
language of the grant and not merely a preamble.79
2.

Power Limited to Creation of Copyright and Patent Schemes

Finding that the “to promote . . .” phrase is not merely preambular does not
suggest that the power granted by the clause extends beyond legislating in the
areas of copyright and patent. The clause, read in its entirety, identifies the
means by which Congress may achieve its goals. “The Congress shall have
Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries; . . . .”80 The “by securing” phrase is specific and
can only be read as limiting the “to promote” phrase. Hence, the phrase
authorizes Congress to promote the progress of science and useful arts
pursuant to this clause only in the ways identified in the “by securing”
phrase—by affording copyright and patent protection.81

77. See WEBSTER’S II: NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 582 (1995) (listing one definition of
“introduce” as: “[t]o open or begin: PREFACE” and one definition of “introductory” as: “[s]erving
to introduce”).
78. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE:
UNABRIDGED 1783 (Philip Babcock Gove ed., 1993) (1961).
79. See Solum, supra note 65, at 21–25 (making strong case that the phrase is part of the
grant); Walterscheid, supra note 65, at 358–78 (rejecting characterization of the phrase as merely
meaningless preamble).
80. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
81. This Article does not suggest that by limiting the “To promote the Progress of Science”
phrase the Copyright Clause negates Congress’s power to promote the progress of science in
other ways pursuant to other powers granted by the Constitution such as the Commerce Clause,
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, or the General Welfare Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
Compare Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104 COLUM. L.
REV. 272 (2004) (arguing that the Intellectual Property Clause does not act as a limitation on

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

318

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50:307

Edward Walterscheid, who has done excellent work in the area of the
history of the Copyright Clause, disagrees. He reads the “by securing” phrase
“as an explanation of, rather than a limitation on, the ‘to promote’ language.”82
He suggests that the clause authorizes Congress to promote the progress of
science and useful arts in ways other than through copyright and patent
protection.83 If this view is correct, then the Eldred petitioners were right—
any legislation in the area of copyright must first and foremost promote the
progress of science. This interpretation of the Copyright Clause, however, is
contrary to the plain meaning of the text of the clause.84 A deviation from the
constitutional text arguably might be forgiven if compelling evidence indicated
that the Framers in fact intended something other than what they said (and the
ratifiers understood that meaning), but the historical record is devoid of such
evidence.
Walterscheid claims support in original intent of the clause and makes
three points.85 First, there is little evidence in the contemporaneous record to
support the plain meaning interpretation of the clause.86 Second, other means
for promoting the progress of science and useful arts were known at the time of
the Federal Constitutional Convention.87 Third, “indirect evidence” suggests
that Washington and Hamilton interpreted the Copyright Clause to grant more
than the power to protect copyrights and patents.88
Given that there is scarce evidence expressing any contemporaneous views
of the Framers of the Copyright Clause, it comes as no surprise that there is
little evidence for any particular view. What evidence there is, however,
strongly suggests that, concerning the clause, the Framers and ratifiers were
focused exclusively on the copyright and patent powers. The Federalist’s
comments on the Copyright Clause, brief though they may have been, indicate
that the Framers understood that the purpose of the clause was to empower
Congress to create a national copyright system and a national patent system.
Madison wrote:
other Article I powers), with Walterscheid, supra note 65, at 352–54 (discussing the view that the
Copyright Clause limits other Article I powers).
82. Walterscheid, supra note 65, at 356.
83. Id. at 347–48 (noting that if the “by securing” phrase is viewed as explanation, then the
clause empowers Congress to promote the progress of science and useful arts by a wide variety of
means, not merely by copyrights and patents); see also id. at 351–52, 357 (arguing for broad
interpretation); Edward C. Walterscheid, Conforming the General Welfare Clause and the
Intellectual Property Clause, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 87, 94–97 (1999) (arguing for broad
interpretation).
84. Walterscheid faults the drafting of the clause—“the Framers unartfully phrased it.”
Walterscheid, supra note 65, at 357.
85. Id. at 351–52.
86. Id. at 351.
87. Id. at 351 n.106.
88. Id. at 351–52.
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The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copy-right of
authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain, to be a right at common
law. The right to useful inventions, seems with equal reason to belong to the
inventors. The public good fully coincides in both cases with the claims of
individuals.89

There is no word or hint of a broader power to promote the progress of science
or useful arts in ways other than through copyrights or patents. If the clause
were intended to have such a broad sweep, one would have expected
discussion or explanation supporting a broad meaning.
Even if the language of the Copyright Clause was “unartfully” drafted,90 it
likely was understood and ratified as written.91 There are few recorded
references to the Copyright Clause during the ratification debates, but what
references there are support a narrow view of the clause limited to copyright
and patent legislation. During the ratification debates in Connecticut in 1788,
Roger Sherman, himself an important Framer of the Constitution,92 publicly
wrote that one of the new powers vested in the United States was “for
promoting the progress of science in the mode therein pointed out.”93 In the
ratification debates before the Pennsylvania convention, Thomas McKean’s
only reference to the Copyright Clause focused on “the power of securing to
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their writings and discoveries” with
no reference to a broader power.94
At the Constitutional Convention, Madison initially proposed the powers
“To secure to literary authors their copyrights for a limited time,” “To establish
an University,” and “To encourage by premiums & provisions, the

89. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 58, at 222 (James Madison).
90. See supra note 84.
91. Justice Story aptly put it:
Nothing but the text itself was adopted by the people. And it would certainly be a most
extravagant doctrine to give to any commentary then made, and, a fortiori, to any
commentary since made under a very different posture of feeling and opinion, an
authority, which should operate an absolute limit upon the text, or should supersede its
natural and just interpretation.
1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 406 (1833).
92. Sherman actively participated in the debates at the Constitutional Convention and was a
member, along with Madison, of the Committee of Eleven, which worked on the language of the
Copyright Clause and reported it to the Convention for approval. See 2 CONVENTION RECORDS,
supra note 49, at 473, 481, 505, 508–09.
93. 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF RATIFICATION, supra note 61, at 525 (emphasis added).
This view appears to be consistent with Sherman’s views in 1789 when, as a member of
Congress, he opposed funding a scientific voyage suggesting that protection for petitioner’s
discovery or invention was as far as Congress should go—“as far as warranted by the
Constitution.” 10 DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 213 (Charlene Bangs Bickford
et al. eds., 1992).
94. 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF RATIFICATION, supra note 60, at 415.
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advancement of useful knowledge and discoveries.”95 That same day,
Pinckney proposed the powers “To establish seminaries for the promotion of
literature and the arts & sciences,” “To grant patents for useful inventions,”
and “To secure to Authors exclusive rights for a certain time.”96 These
proposals were submitted initially to the Committee of Detail but later fell to
the Committee of Eleven whose members included both Madison and
Sherman.97 Walterscheid suggests that the intellectual property clause
combined the copyright, patent, and “advancement of useful knowledge”
provisions into one and concludes that incorporation of language close to the
“advancement of useful knowledge” provision “suggests that the Framers
viewed the intellectual property clause expansively.”98
Significantly, however, the more expansive language authorizing grants of
premiums and provisions for the advancement of useful knowledge and
discoveries proposed by Madison did not survive the committee and never
became part of the Constitution, nor is there any hint in the Copyright Clause
that it was intended to operate in such a way. Walterscheid concedes that both
Madison and Sherman took a limited view of the Intellectual Property
Clause.99
The views of Madison should be accorded particularly great weight in
determining what the Framers intended as it concerns the Copyright Clause.
Madison, after all, proposed the copyright power and the “advancement of
useful knowledge” powers, and he served on the Committee of Eleven that
came up with the final language of the Copyright Clause.100 Sherman, too, was
95. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 49, at 325.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 321–22, 324 (submitted to Committee of Detail); id. at 473, 481 (appointing
Committee of Eleven to consider unfinished business; listing committee members).
98. Walterscheid, supra note 83, at 94; accord Walterscheid, supra note 65, at 343.
99. See Walterscheid, supra note 83, at 103 (recognizing that Madison and Sherman
“narrowly construed the clause”). Walterscheid concludes that
Madison narrowly construed the intellectual property clause as authorizing only the
issuance of patents of invention and precluding any other means of promoting the
progress of useful arts. Although he was silent as to the issue of promoting the progress
of science, i.e., learning and knowledge as encompassed within the broad compass of
education, it is apparent that his argument necessarily applied to federal funding of
education as well.
Id. at 105. Walterscheid’s view that Madison narrowly construed the clause appears correct.
This Article takes no position on the issue of whether Madison viewed the clause as a general bar
to any efforts under other constitutional provisions that had the effect of promoting the progress
of science in other ways.
100. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 49, at 473, 481, 505, 508–09. Madison likely
played the most important role of any Framer in the inclusion of the Copyright Clause in the
Constitution. See Dallon, supra note 10, at 421–23 (noting Madison’s involvement in copyright
legislation beginning in the Continental Congress in 1783, the Virginia legislature in 1785, and
the Constitutional Convention).
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a member of the Committee of Eleven. Significantly, Madison and Sherman,
the only members of the Committee of Eleven with known views about the
Copyright Clause, appear to have viewed the clause as limited to copyright and
patent legislation. Even Alexander Hamilton, one of the most radical, procentral government members of the Constitutional Convention,101 in some
respects either agreed with or acknowledged Madison’s limited view of the
Intellectual Property Clause.102
The Framers’ debate concerning the proposal to include the power for
Congress to establish a national university also supports the view that the
Framers did not intend the “to promote” phrase to extend beyond copyrights
and patents. Madison and Pinckney initially proposed the power to establish a
university, in Madison’s words,103 or a seminary, in Pinckney’s words,104 and
Pinckney added: “for the promotion of literature and the arts & sciences.”105
The Committee of Eleven deleted this power from its report, and Madison and
Pinckney jointly moved to reinsert the power to establish a university in the list
of congressional powers.106 The Convention rejected the proposal.107
Madison and Pinckney’s joint motion to insert the power was proposed,
debated, and rejected after the Convention had already agreed to the Copyright
Clause.108 Gouverneur Morris argued that it was not necessary because it
would already be achieved by the “exclusive power at the Seat of

101. Hamilton’s views were radical in their strong support for a powerful central government.
See JOHN C. MILLER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON: PORTRAIT IN PARADOX 161–62 (1959) (noting
Hamilton’s support of a strong central government and stating “[h]ad Hamilton seen his way
clear, he no doubt would have recommended the abolition of the states”). His views on the
meaning of the Copyright Clause, while of interest, are less convincing than those of Madison
and Sherman, in part because he was absent from the convention when the clause was proposed,
drafted, and approved. See 1 BROADUS MITCHELL, ALEXANDER HAMILTON: YOUTH TO
MATURITY 1755–1788, at 407 (1957) (noting Hamilton’s absence from the Convention for most
of August and noting that “[t]he next mention of Hamilton in the convention proceedings is on
September 6, which is probably as early as he attended”); 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note
49, at 321–22 (noting proposal of copyright and patent powers on Aug. 18, 1787); id. at 505, 509
(noting approval of Copyright Clause on Sept. 5, 1787).
102. See Walterscheid, supra note 83, at 109 (stating that Hamilton conceded that there was a
question about the authority of Congress under the Constitution to grant patents of importation).
Hamilton did advocate for broad congressional power to promote the progress of science under
the general welfare clause and implicitly did not view the Copyright Clause as a bar to achieving
those goals. Id. at 111. Significantly, he relied upon other congressional powers and not the
Copyright Clause for the authority. Id.
103. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 49, at 325.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 616.
107. Id.
108. The Copyright Clause was approved on Sept. 5, 1787, 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra
note 49, at 509; the university proposal was rejected on September 14, 1787, id. at 616.
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Government.”109 If the “to promote” phrase was intended to convey a broad
power beyond copyrights and patents, Article I, section 8, clause 8 would have
been primary authority supporting creation of a university. Neither Madison
nor Pinckney would have needed to advocate for insertion of the power “to
establish an University,”110 and Morris could have easily pointed to the power
“to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts” as negating a need for the
separate power to establish a university. These Framers understood that the
Copyright Clause did not reach so far.
The First Congress doubted that the Copyright Clause extended beyond the
grant of copyrights and patents. As early as 1789, in response to a request by
John Churchman to fund a scientific voyage, members of Congress questioned
whether any provision of the Constitution authorized that expenditure.
Representative Tucker,111 one of the three-member committee appointed to
report on the petition, “[e]xpressed a doubt whether the Legislature has power,
by the Constitution, to go further in rewarding the inventors of useful
machines, or discoveries in sciences, than merely to secure to them for a time
the right of making, publishing and vending them.”112 Sherman,113 then a
member of the House of Representatives, also opposed the funding. He
believed that the committee report, which encouraged protection for
Churchman’s map, globe, and tables, went far enough.114 “It appears gone as
far as proper to go at this time, as far as warranted by the Constitution.”115

109. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (giving power to legislate over the seat of the
United States government).
110. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 49, at 616.
111. Thomas Tudor Tucker was a representative from South Carolina in the First and Second
Congresses, and he was the United States treasurer from 1801–1828. 14 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 858, 862
(William C. DiGiacomantonio et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
FIRST CONGRESS].
112. 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA 220 (Charles Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter 10 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF FIRST CONGRESS].
113. Roger Sherman was a representative from Connecticut in the First Congress and was
then appointed to the Senate. 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIRST CONGRESS, supra note 111,
at 512.
114. See 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIRST CONGRESS supra note 112, at 213; 4
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 510 (Charles Bangs Bickford, et. al. eds., 1986) (providing text of Apr. 20, 1789
committee report) [hereinafter 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIRST CONGRESS].
115. 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIRST CONGRESS, supra note 112, at 213. Lloyd’s
sometimes cryptic notes of Sherman’s speech continue:
This report of committee will show that they supposed his discovery worthy attention and
giving the exclusive right to benefit by the discovery. If have a right to go further and lay
out money it must be upon—Gentleman has fruitful invention. . . . The committee thought
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When the same funding proposal was made again in 1790, a committee of
three, which included Madison, stated that the proposal “involves an enquiry
into the Constitutional powers of Congress, as well as the expediency of
furnishing the aid requested . . . .”116 The proposal was rejected by the
House.117
This understanding of the Copyright Clause is confirmed by other early
authorities. Law professor and judge St. George Tucker118 in 1803 wrote that
the constitution not only declares the object, but points out the express mode of
giving the encouragement . . . . Nothing could be more superfluous, or
incompatible, with the object contended for, than these words, if it was,
indeed, the intention of the constitution to authorize congress, to adopt any
other mode which they might think proper.119

United States Attorney General William Wirt, arguing Gibbons v. Ogden,120
stated the view that “Congress has the power to promote the progress of
science and the useful arts; but only in one mode, viz. by securing, for a
limited time, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries.”121 Justice Joseph Story, in 1833, wrote of the clause
that “[t]he power, in its terms, is confined to authors and inventors.”122
President Washington believed that the Constitution, at least somewhere,
allowed promotion of science and knowledge by means other than copyrights

fit to go as far as this to promote the progress; they did not think proper to give any
further power to encourage this useful discovery.
Id. Rep. Seney of Maryland, 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIRST CONGRESS, supra note 111,
at 589, likewise doubted that the Copyright Clause authorized Congress to fund the expedition.
Lloyd’s cryptic notes summarize Seney’s comments: “Doubt if—No doubt of adopting the report
to secure—I have doubts whether in power or not to give money. I much doubt if
encouragement—any other mode than that mentioned, other than securing.” 10 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 112, at 214.
116. 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIRST CONGRESS, supra note 114, at 531.
117. 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA 689 (Linda G. De Pauw, et. al. eds., 1977) (“It passed in the negative.”) [hereinafter
3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIRST CONGRESS]; 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIRST
CONGRESS, supra note 114, at 529–30 (motion “disagreed to”).
118. St. George Tucker was also the brother of U.S. Rep. Thomas Tucker.
14
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIRST CONGRESS, supra note 111, at 858–59.
119. 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE,
TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES;
AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 266–67 (1803).
120. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
121. Id. at 165–66; see also id. at 166 (stating that the clause is the grant “of one mode of
promoting the progress of science and the useful arts,” recognizing that other modes existed and
could clearly be exercised by the states).
122. 3 STORY, supra note 91, § 1148. But see 2 id. § 968 (suggesting that a tax on foreigners
or foreign inventions might be appropriate construing the power to tax and the power to promote
the progress of science and useful arts).
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and patents, and he encouraged Congress to establish and fund a national
university.123 Washington did not point to the constitutional provision that
would authorize establishment of a national university, and members of
Congress were quick to question the constitutionality of such action.124 No
action was taken on Washington’s proposal.125
In short, on the admittedly thin record available, it appears that the Framers
and ratifiers of the Copyright Clause first and foremost intended to grant
Congress the power to enact copyright laws and patent laws. This grant of
power would necessarily further the objective of promoting the progress of
science and useful arts. The Framers did not intend to grant, at least by means
of the Copyright Clause, a broad power to take any action to promote the
progress of science.
3.

Taking the Broad View of Promoting the Progress of Science

The petitioners in Eldred made the argument that the retroactive extension
of existing copyrights failed to promote the progress of science because the
extension failed to stimulate creation of new works.126 The petitioners, in
substance, restated this same argument a second time when they argued that
the clause requires a “quid pro quo”; the author gives the work in exchange for
the rights afforded by copyright protection.127 This view is born of a narrow
reading of the “to promote” phrase, not supported by the language or history of
the clause.
“To promote the Progress of Science” means to encourage the
advancement of knowledge. In the language of the late eighteenth century,

123. See 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIRST CONGRESS, supra note 117, at 253–54 (text of
Washington’s speech to both houses of Congress, dated Jan. 8, 1790).
124. 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA 1221 (Helen Veit et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
FIRST CONGRESS]. Rep. Stone, of Maryland, see 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIRST
CONGRESS, supra note 111, at 598,
enquired what part of the Constitution authorised Congress to take any steps in a business
of this kind—for his part he knew of none. We have already done as much as we can with
propriety—We have encouraged learning, by giving to authors an exclusive privilege of
vending their works—this is going as far as we have power to, by the Constitution.
13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIRST CONGRESS, supra, at 1221. But cf. id. (stating Rep. Page
thought that Congress did have the power but suggested the matter be investigated).
125. The proposal was made in 1790 and again in 1796. See 1 THE STATE OF THE UNION
MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENT 1790–1966, at 3, 35 (Fred L. Israel ed., 1966).
126. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 211–12 (2003); see also Brief for Petitioners, supra
note 11, at 15–16, 22 (making the argument that enactments must stimulate creation of works).
127. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 214; Brief for Petitioners, supra note 11, at 23 (“Congress may
make a trade—it may grant an ‘exclusive Right’ for a ‘limited Time[ ]’ in exchange for a
‘Writing’ by an ‘Author.’”). Under this theory, the CTEA violates the requirement by awarding a
windfall—additional copyright protection in exchange for nothing. See id.
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“science” had the broad meaning of knowledge.128 “Promote” meant to
advance, to forward, or to contribute to the growth of something.129 “Promote”
also meant “encourage.”130 “Progress” meant an “advance in knowledge;
intellectual or moral improvement; proficiency.”131 Thus, the clause intended
to forward or encourage the advancement of knowledge.132 This interpretation
is in harmony with the copyright objectives stated by Congress immediately
following ratification of the Constitution in the Copyright Act of 1790. In
genuinely preambular language, Congress stated the purpose of the law: “An
Act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies . . . to the
authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times therein mentioned.”133

128. The early American authority Noah Webster defined “science”: “1. In a general sense,
knowledge, or certain knowledge . . . . 4. Any art or species of knowledge. . . . 5. One of the
seven liberal branches of knowledge, viz. grammar, logic, rhetoric, arithmetic, geometry,
astronomy and music.” 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (Johnson Reprint Corporation 1970) (1828) (unpaginated); accord 2 SAMUEL
JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1785) (unpaginated; giving
essentially identical definition of “science” as Webster).
129. 2 WEBSTER, supra note 128 (definition of “promote”: “To forward; to advance; to
contribute to the growth, enlargement or excellence of any thing valuable . . . .”); 2 JOHNSON,
supra note 128 (defining “promote” as to “To forward; to advance”).
130. See 2 WEBSTER, supra note 128 (definition of “promotion”: “The act of promoting;
advancement; encouragement . . . .”); 2 JOHNSON, supra note 128 (defining “promotion” as
“Advancement; encouragement”); see also Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973)
(finding “to promote” synonymous with “to stimulate,” “to encourage,” or “to induce”). Both the
Pennsylvania and New York copyright acts used the word “promote” or “promotion” seemingly
synonymously with encourage or encouragement. See COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note 55,
at 10 (Pennsylvania act, “for the encouragement and promotion of learning”); id. at 19 (New York
act, “AN ACT to promote literature”).
131. 2 WEBSTER, supra note 128 (definition of “progress”); accord 2 JOHNSON, supra note
128 (defining “progress” as “Intellectual improvement; advancement in knowledge;
proficience”); cf. Orrin G. Hatch & Thomas R. Lee, “To Promote the Progress of Science”: The
Copyright Clause and Congress’s Power to Extend Copyrights, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 12
(2002) (arguing that to “promote the progress of science” meant to promote distribution or
dissemination of works); Malla Pollack, What is Congress Supposed to Promote?: Defining
“Progress” in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution or Introducing the
Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754, 803, 809 (2001) (arguing that “progress” in the Copyright
Clause means physical “spread”). The Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island
copyright acts made reference to the need to encourage “the progress of civilization.”
COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note 55, at 4, 8–9.
132. James Iredell (later Justice Iredell), in urging ratification of the Constitution, appeared to
equate the language with “encouragement to genius.” 16 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION, supra note 28, at 386 (Norfolk & Portsmouth J., by “Marcus IV” (James Iredell),
dated Mar. 12, 1788).
133. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. This language closely parallels the language
of the first English copyright statute, the Statute of Anne in 1710. 8 Ann., c. 19 (1710) (Eng.)
(“An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by vesting the Copies of printed Books in the
Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein mentioned”).
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Representative Stone’s statement in May 1790 also appeared to equate
promoting the progress of science with encouraging learning.134 The
encouragement of learning theme had also been expressed in the state
copyright acts, just prior to the Constitution.135
The “to promote” phrase on its face is broad. The Framers intended for
Congress to have the power to legislate in the area of copyrights. They further
communicated their belief and desire that copyright protection would have the
effect of promoting the progress of science but likely they did not intend
judicial scrutiny of each amendment to a copyright act to determine whether
the enactment standing alone promoted the progress of science. This may have
been the Supreme Court’s point when it held that “the Copyright Clause
empowers Congress to determine the intellectual property regimes that,
overall, in that body’s judgment, will serve the ends of the Clause.”136 So long
as the resulting copyright act promotes the progress of science, then a
particular germane amendment need not be measured against the “to promote”
phrase.
Taking the petitioners’ view of the “to promote” clause would call into
question other amendments of the Copyright Act of 1976 (the “1976 Act”). In
1990, Congress enacted the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA), and added
section 106A to the 1976 Act.137 VARA allows an author of a work of visual
art to claim authorship of the work, to prevent use of the author’s name in
some cases, and to prevent distortion, mutilation, or destruction of the work,
regardless of whether or not the author is the copyright owner.138 The Act
applied retroactively to already-created works still owned139 by the authors, as

134. 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIRST CONGRESS, supra note 124, at 1221 (quoting
Gazette of the United States, 5 May 1790) (“We have encouraged learning, by giving to authors
an exclusive privilege of vending their works—this is going as far as we have power to, by the
Constitution.”); cf. 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIRST CONGRESS, supra note 112, at 213
(statement of Rep. Sherman, Apr. 20, 1789, referring to Churchman’s request to fund his
scientific voyage; noting that beyond copyright and patent protections, “[t]he committee thought
fit to go as far as this to promote the progress; they did not think proper to give any further power
to encourage this useful discovery”).
135. See, e.g., COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note 55, at 1–2 (Connecticut act, “for the
encouragement of literature and genius,” “for the encouragement of learning”); id. at 6 (New
Jersey act, “for the promotion and encouragement of literature”); id. at 10 (Pennsylvania act, “for
the encouragement and promotion of learning”); id. at 17 (Georgia act, “encourage men of
learning and genius”).
136. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003) (emphasis added).
137. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §603, 104 Stat. 5089, 5128–33
(1990) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000)).
138. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a).
139. In this sense, “owned” has reference to the tangible medium in which the work is fixed
rather than the copyright. See id. § 106A(d)(2) (referencing works “title to which has not . . .
been transferred from the author”).
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well as to future works.140 The new benefits conferred upon authors of this
class of existing works did not create an incentive for creation of those works.
With VARA, borrowing the terminology of the Eldred petitioners, there was
no “quid pro quo,” but rather “a windfall” to authors of those particular
existing works; authors did not give a work to the public in exchange for these
added protections.
The broad view of the “to promote” phrase does not require such an
analysis. Instead, this view would inquire whether the 1976 Act, as amended
by VARA, continued to secure to authors for limited times rights to their
works which would have the effect of promoting knowledge. Alternatively, a
more limited but still broad view would inquire whether VARA itself secured
to authors for limited times rights to their works that would have the effect of
promoting knowledge. VARA would pass either of these tests. First, the basic
copyright scheme remained intact, and authors received new rights to their
works. Second, these new rights allowed authors to preserve works and
truthfully inform the public concerning the origin and nature of those works.
In 1994, Congress enacted the Uruguay Round Agreements Act
(URAA)141 adding section 104A to the 1976 Act.142 The amendment restored
copyright in certain existing foreign works that had passed into the public
domain.143 The authors of works whose copyrights were restored did not give
anything to the public in exchange for the new copyright protection. The
broad view of the “to promote” phrase does not require such an exchange.144
The basic copyright scheme remained intact, and arguably the restored
copyright owners might be encouraged to create new works by perceived
strong commitment to copyright protection demonstrated by the Act.
Many provisions of the 1976 Act taken in isolation, had they been offered
as amendments to the Act, would not have provided incentive for creation of
new works. For example, section 108,145 permitting certain copying of works

140. Id. In fact, the Act provides a longer duration of protection for the category of works
created before the effective date of the Act but whose title remained in the author, than for those
works created after the effective date of the Act. See id. § 106A(d)(1) (stating that rights in posteffective date works last only for life of the author); id. § 106A(d)(2) (qualifying pre-effective
date works receive protection for the same term as rights conveyed under § 106 (now life of the
author plus seventy years)).
141. Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 514, 108 Stat. 4976 (1994).
142. 17 U.S.C. § 104A.
143. Id. § 104A(a), (h)(6).
144. Two courts recently rejected attacks on the constitutionality of the URAA. See Luck’s
Music Library, Inc. v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 1262 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding restoration of
copyrights under URAA constitutional); Golan v. Gonzales, No. Civ. 01-B-1854 (BNB), 2005
WL 914754, at *2 (D. Colo. Apr. 20, 2005) (same).
145. 17 U.S.C. § 108. Section 108 was part of the original 1976 Act, although it has been
amended.
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by libraries and archives, and section 110,146 announcing exceptions to the
performance and display rights, primarily limit authors’ exclusive rights.
Permitting copying, performance, or display of protected works without
authorization of the copyright holder, while perfectly sensible and beneficial to
the public, does not create incentives for authors of the original works to create
new works—if anything, it reduces the incentives otherwise afforded by the
exclusive rights. Nevertheless, these provisions, as part of a larger copyright
act, support a scheme of incentives for authors. Moreover, individually each
promotes the progress of science by providing the public reasonable access and
opportunity to use protected works. These provisions, had they come as later
amendments to the Copyright Act, could have been viewed as “windfalls”—
this time not for copyright holders, but for the public.
The point is this: adopting the Eldred petitioners’ reading of the Copyright
Clause would have invited untold mischief by imposing close scrutiny of each
amendment of the Copyright Act to determine whether the amendment on its
own merits promoted the progress of science by encouraging creation of new
works or publication of works. This limited approach would call into question
many prior or future amendments, which might strengthen or improve the
overall copyright scheme, but which, standing alone, do not encourage creation
or publication of works. The petitioners tried to avoid this problem by limiting
their test only to amendments extending the duration of copyrights and thus
implicating the “limited Times” requirement.147 Nevertheless, it is difficult to
justify selective application of the phrase to only copyright terms and not other
aspects of copyright law.
To the extent that the “to promote” phrase is viewed as a limitation on the
power of Congress when legislating in the area of copyrights, the phrase
establishes, at most, only a low threshold. Although the entire clause does
identify the means for achieving the promotion of the progress of science (by
securing to authors exclusive rights to their writings), neither the “to promote”
phrase nor the broader Copyright Clause specifies how copyright law must
promote the progress of science. The Copyright Clause does not specifically
require creation of new works, distribution or publication of unpublished
works, or any other particular knowledge-promoting end.
This broad interpretation of the Copyright Clause is consistent with the
early history of copyrights both in Europe and the United States. The earliest
copyrights in fifteenth century Europe were not strictly reserved for protection
of newly authored works. In some cases these early privileges protected works

146. Id. § 110. Section 110 was also part of the original 1976 Act, although it has been
amended.
147. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 211 (2003) (stating petitioners’ argument that
preamble language was not independently enforceable limit on Congress’s power, but informed
meaning of “limited Times” requirement).
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hundreds of years old and were a means of encouraging publication of existing
works.148 Similarly, in the United States, a major impetus for copyright
protection was Noah Webster’s desire for protection of his nearly completed,
or, as was the case in some states, both completed and published spelling and
grammar book (the “blue-backed speller”).149
The Copyright Act of 1790 (the “1790 Act”) protected works created after
its enactment, but it also protected existing works created before the Act,
including already-published works.150 The 1790 Act was prompted by several
private petitions to Congress for copyright protection for existing works. The
first petition seeking copyright protection was from David Ramsay, who in
April 1789 applied to Congress for copyright protection for two works he had
written.151 The first work already was written and published; the second was
to be published shortly.152 His petition asked for protection of both works “as
a compensation for his labour and expence and finding the same principle
expressly recognized in the new Constitution . . . .”153 The House Committee
report recommended protection for both works without suggesting any
constitutional doubt.154 Rather than moving forward with the petition as an
individual request, however, Congress referred it, and a similar petition from
John Churchman, to a committee for preparation of general copyright
legislation.155

148. See HORATIO F. BROWN, THE VENETIAN PRINTING PRESS 54 (1891) (noting early
practice of granting copyrights to publishers for works authored by others). For example, a
copyright for the Letters of St. Catherine of Siena was granted in 1494–1495. Id. at 58–59. The
letters were originally written from about 1370 to 1380. 1 THE LETTERS OF ST. CATHERINE OF
SIENA 3 (Suzanne Noffke trans., 1988).
149. See Nachbar, supra note 62, at 43–44 (rebutting quid pro quo requirement and noting
state copyright protection for Webster’s work). Webster’s book was finished by the summer of
1783 and published on October 7, 1783. RICHARD M. ROLLINS, THE LONG JOURNEY OF NOAH
WEBSTER 34 (1980). Congress passed its resolution encouraging states to enact copyright laws in
May 1783, and the various states passed their copyright laws during the period of early 1783 to
1786. See COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note 55, at 1–21; see also, e.g., Letter from Noah
Webster to the New York State Legislature (Jan. 18, 1783), in LETTERS OF NOAH WEBSTER 5, 5
(Harry R. Warfel ed., 1953) (letter asking state to grant copyright protection to Webster’s book);
Letter from Noah Webster to James Madison (July 5, 1784), in LETTERS OF NOAH WEBSTER
supra, at 8, 9 (letter asking Madison to encourage Virginia legislature to grant copyright
protection to Webster’s book).
150. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (1790).
151. 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA 34–35 (Kenneth R. Bowling et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter 8 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF FIRST CONGRESS] (Petition of David Ramsay, Charleston, S.C., dated Apr. 4, 1789).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIRST CONGRESS, supra note 61, at 29 (House Journal
entry for Apr. 20, 1789).
155. Id.
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Shortly after the Ramsay and Churchman petitions, Jedidiah Morse applied
to Congress for copyright protection for his already-written and published
work, again noting Congress’s power under the Constitution.156 Morse
complained that his work was already being copied without his consent.157
The House, again without any suggestion of a constitutional problem, referred
his petition to the committee tasked to prepare general copyright legislation.158
Ultimately, in 1790, Congress enacted the first United States copyright act, and
soon after the Act was passed both Churchman and Morse registered the
copyrights for their already existing and published works.159 (It is not known
whether Ramsay ever registered the copyrights in the works referred to in his
petition because the records of the courthouse where he would have registered
them no longer exist.)160 The important point is that early authors and the First
Congress, which included many Framers, in 1790 understood the Copyright
Clause in the only recently ratified Constitution to empower Congress to grant
copyright protection to existing, published works. Possibly, by rewarding
authors of existing works Congress believed it promoted the progress of
science by providing remuneration161 for their past efforts, hence encouraging
those same authors to continue their creative efforts in the future.162 In any
event, the approach of the First Congress is consistent with a broad
understanding of the “to promote” phrase and discredits the Eldred petitioners’
156. 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIRST CONGRESS, supra note 151, at 36 (Petition of
Jedidiah Morse, Charlestown, Mass., dated Apr. 15, 1789 and May 12, 1789). Others also
petitioned Congress for copyright protection for their existing works. See, e.g., id. at 36–37
(Nicholas Pike to Benjamin Goodhue, May 23, 1789) (seeking protection for his published work);
3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIRST CONGRESS, supra note 117, at 118 (House Journal entry for
July 22, 1789) (referring to petition by Hannah Adams seeking “an exclusive privilege” for “a
limited time” to publish her work on religious sects); id. at 424 (House Journal entry for May 26,
1790) (referencing petition of Enos Hitchcock seeking copyright protection for his published
book).
157. 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIRST CONGRESS, supra note 151, at 36.
158. 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIRST CONGRESS, supra note 117, at 56–57, 60 (House
Journal entries for May 12 & 14, 1789).
159. 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIRST CONGRESS, supra note 151, at 29–30.
Churchman’s works were registered on June 17, 1790; Morse’s works were registered on July 10,
1790. Id. Others who had sought copyright protection also registered their works. Adams
registered the second edition of her work on July 6, 1791. Id. at 31. Hitchcock registered his
work on Aug. 9, 1790. Id. at 32.
160. Id. at 29. Two of Ramsay’s other works, both “orations,” were registered for copyright
protection in 1794 and 1800. FEDERAL COPYRIGHT RECORDS 1790–1800, at 130–31 (James
Gilreath ed., 1987) (reproducing South Carolina district court copyright records for 1794–1800).
161. Or, in the words of the times, “pecuniary emolument.” 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
RATIFICATION, supra note 151, at 35 (House Committee Report on Ramsay and Churchman
Petitions, Apr. 20, 1789).
162. In the case of Churchman, in particular, the House committee considering his petition
viewed the award of copyright as encouragement of his continuing research efforts in the area of
navigation based on magnetic points. Id.
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argument that any congressional copyright enactment must stimulate creation
of new works that must be offered up by the author in exchange for the
copyright protection.163
The Eldred petitioners argued that the 1790 Act, by extending copyright
protection to existing works, involved the necessary exchange of the authors’
state-granted or common law copyrights for federal copyright protection.164
This argument has as its necessary premises first, that the authors of existing
works already held legally protected rights, and second, that the new federal
copyright protection preempted or superseded those existing rights. The first
premise is necessary or otherwise the authors would have had nothing of value
to surrender in exchange for federal protection. Some of those seeking
protection for their already-written works did have state copyright
registrations,165 but others likely did not.166 The 1790 Act was completely
indifferent to the existence of prior copyright protection and offered protection
for published works regardless of their state copyright status.167
Concerning common law copyright, although there may have been some
theoretical question about the existence of common law copyright, it was clear
that, to the extent the right existed at all,168 it did not afford any practical legal
protection. The forces seeking copyright protection in the states prior to the
Constitution and on the federal level thereafter were not seeking an improved
mechanism to enforce existing, recognized legal rights. These authors had no
legal protection for their copyright interests, and they understood keenly the
need for statutory copyright protection. In advocating for state copyright laws,
Noah Webster did not argue that existing protections were ineffective, rather,
he complained that his book and efforts were “not protected by the laws that
protect every other species of property.”169 Jedidiah Morse, in the spring of
1789, petitioned Congress for copyright protection, noting “as the work is
already published and as your Petitioner has no Security against its
163. See supra notes 126–36 and accompanying text.
164. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 11, at 28–29.
165. See, e.g., 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIRST CONGRESS, supra note 151, at 30–31.
Nicholas Pike had copyrights in four states before petitioning Congress for protection. Id. at 31.
Hannah Adams had a copyright under Massachusetts law before petitioning Congress for
protection. Id.
166. Delaware did not have state copyright protection, and some state copyright laws may
never have become operative. See COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note 55, at 21. Delaware
had no act. Id. Maryland’s act was to become effective only after all states had passed similar
acts. Id. at 6. Pennsylvania’s act also was to become effective only after all states had passed
similar acts. Id. at 11.
167. See Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 1, §1, 1 Stat. 124 (1790).
168. The Supreme Court in 1834 held that there was no common law copyright for published
works in America. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 663 (1834).
169. Letter from Noah Webster to the New York State Legislature (Jan. 1783), in LETTERS OF
NOAH WEBSTER, supra note 149, at 5, 7.
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Republication by any other person.”170 Authors of existing works did not give
up any meaningful common law copyrights in exchange for the new federal
copyright protection afforded by the 1790 Act.
The second premise, that the new federal copyright statute preempted or
superseded existing rights, is at best uncertain and likely incorrect. It is
doubtful whether the Copyright Clause or the 1790 Act preempted state
copyright protections,171 and in modern times the Supreme Court has

170. 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIRST CONGRESS, supra note 151, at 36.
171. Edward Walterscheid takes the view that the First Congress likely believed that the
Intellectual Property Clause did preempt state patent and copyright laws, and appears to agree that
this is the better view. EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY CLAUSE: A STUDY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 436, 468–69 (2002). There is
historical support for this view. Nicholas Pike, who petitioned Congress in 1789 for copyright
protection, apparently believed that his state copyrights were invalid, possibly due to the adoption
of the Constitution. He stated:
As I find that one & another are petitioning Congress respecting the Copy-rights of
their Works; I beg leave to request the favor of your Attention in my behalf.
I have already been at great trouble & some Cost in sending through the United
States for the purpose of securing mine; which is now of no Validity.
8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIRST CONGRESS, supra note 151, at 36; see also WILLIAM
RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 102 (1825)
(stating, specifically in reference to state patent laws, that “there can be no doubt that, as soon as
congress legislated on the subject . . . all the state provisions ceased”).
There is, however, evidence suggesting that the clause did not preempt state copyright
protection. The Patent Act of 1793, also authorized by Article I, section 8, clause 8, required an
applicant for federal patent to relinquish any rights obtained under prior state laws. “That where
any state, before its adoption of the present form of government, shall have granted an exclusive
right to any invention, the party, claiming that right, shall not be capable of obtaining an
exclusive right under this act, but on relinquishing his right under such particular state . . . .”
Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 7, 1 Stat. 318, 322 (1793) (prior to revisions in Patent Act of 1836).
If the Intellectual Property Clause preempted prior state law protections, the provision of the 1793
Patent Act would have been completely unnecessary. Rawle believed that the provision was
included as an act of caution, see RAWLE, supra, at 102, but at a minimum the provision
demonstrates doubt whether the clause preempted state law protections and may indicate that in
fact it did not. Also, on its face the Act permitted a holder of a state right to retain the state
protection and decline federal protection.
Other evidence also suggests that the Copyright Clause did not limit or preempt state
copyright protections. See also BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND
COPYRIGHT LAW 124 (1967) (noting that state copyright systems “passed out of use” but were
“not rendered illegal by the Federal legislation and did not die immediately” as demonstrated by
issuance of a copyright under South Carolina law in 1792 after enactment of the first federal
copyright act); Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507, 581 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1812) (Kent, C.J.,
separate opinion) (“That power only secures, for a limited time, to authors and inventors the
exclusive privilege to their writings and discoveries; and as it is not granted, by exclusive words,
to the United States, nor prohibited to the individual states, it is a concurrent power which may be
exercised by the states . . . .”). Many of the state copyright acts were not repealed until many
years after the Constitution and the 1790 Act. See, e.g., COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note
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concluded that as a matter of constitutional law the states have concurrent
power to grant copyright protection.172 In Goldstein v. California, the Court
held that the Copyright Clause “does not provide that such power shall vest
exclusively in the Federal Government. Nor does the Constitution expressly
provide that such power shall not be exercised by the States.”173 Nothing in
the 1790 Act expressly negated state-granted copyright protection.174 Federal
copyright protection likely did not formally replace or void any existing state
copyright grants, although as a practical matter it may have made state
copyright grants obsolete because of the advantages of federal protection.
As it concerned common law copyright protection, in Wheaton v. Peters,175
the Supreme Court found that no common law copyright existed in the United
States.176 Therefore, the Court had no reason to reach the question of whether
either the Constitution or the copyright act of the time preempted an existing
common law right.
Later, the Copyright Act of 1909 (the “1909 Act”) afforded statutory
copyright protection only to published works,177 thus creating a direct incentive
for publication of works—not merely the creation of new works. In contrast,
the Copyright Act of 1976 (the “1976 Act”) affords copyright protection upon
fixation in a tangible medium, instead of publication.178 Each of these schemes
(the 1790 Act, the 1909 Act, and the 1976 Act) promoted learning or
knowledge, although they differed in substance and detail.
The Framers may have believed that copyright protection primarily would
advance knowledge by encouraging creation of new works or publication of
previously unpublished works, but the language of the Constitution is not
limited to those ends. The Framers did not tie down future generations to any
particular view of the progress of science. Justice Story, in Martin v. Hunter’s
Lessee,179 recognized that
[t]he constitution unavoidably deals in general language. It did not suit the
purposes of the people, in framing this great charter of our liberties, to provide
for minute specifications of its powers, or to declare the means by which those
55, at 3 (Connecticut act repealed in 1812); id. at 7 (New Jersey act repealed in 1799); id. at 8
(New Hampshire act repealed in 1842).
172. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 560 (1973) (“[T]he language of the
Constitution neither explicitly precludes the States from granting copyrights nor grants such
authority exclusively to the Federal Government.”).
173. Id. at 553.
174. In contrast, the Copyright Act of 1976, by statute, does preempt most state copyright
protection. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2000).
175. 33 U.S. 591 (8 Pet.) (1834).
176. Id. at 661, 663.
177. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 9, 35 Stat. 1075, 1077 (protection required publication
with notice).
178. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
179. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
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powers should be carried into execution. . . . The instrument was not intended
to provide merely for the exigencies of a few years, but was to endure through
a long lapse of ages . . . .180

The Pennsylvania Constitution, a close contemporary of the United States
Constitution,181 contained the provision: “The arts and sciences shall be
promoted in one or more seminaries of learning.”182 Pinckney proposed
similar language for the United States Constitution at the same time he
proposed the patent and copyright powers.183 Like the Copyright Clause, the
Pennsylvania provision identified the objective—“the arts and sciences shall be
promoted”—and the means to achieve that objective (implying establishment
of “one or more seminaries of learning”).184 The provision did not direct how
universities must promote the arts and sciences, nor would one expect a
constitutional provision to be so limiting. This phrase in the Pennsylvania
Constitution, notwithstanding its similarity to the “to promote the progress of
science” phrase, could not reasonably refer exclusively to creation of new
works or inventions of new discoveries. Other state constitutions of the time
also contained language encouraging “arts and sciences” and promotion of arts
and sciences by supporting universities and public schools.185 These
180. Id. at 326. He continued: “Hence its powers are expressed in general terms, leaving to
the legislature, from time to time, to adopt its own means to effectuate legitimate objects, and to
mould and model the exercise of its powers, as its own wisdom, and the public interests, should
require.” Id. at 326–27.
181. The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790 was adopted September 2, 1790. 5 THE
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS: COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF
THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 3092 n.a (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter THE FEDERAL
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS].
182. PA. CONST. of 1790 art. VII, § 2, reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 181, at 3092, 3099.
183. See 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 49, at 324–25 (noting Pinckney’s proposal
empowering Congress “[t]o establish seminaries for the promotion of literature and the arts &
sciences”).
184. PA. CONST. of 1790 art. VII, § 2, reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra, note 181, at 3092, 3099.
185. The Massachusetts Constitution of March 2, 1780, recognized the value of the
“encouragement of arts and sciences” in granted authority to the president and fellows of Harvard
College. MASS. CONST. of 1780 ch. V, § 1, art. 1, reprinted in 3 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 181, at 1906. The same constitution directed the “legislatures and
magistrates . . . to encourage private societies and public institutions, rewards and immunities, for
the promotion of agriculture, arts, sciences.” Id. ch. V, § 2, reprinted in 3 THE FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 181, at 1907; accord N.H. CONST. of 1784 pt. 2, reprinted in
4 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 181, at 2467 (“[I]t shall be the duty of
the legislators and magistrates . . . to encourage private and public institutions, rewards and
immunities for the promotion of agriculture, arts, sciences . . . .”); see also GA. CONST. of 1798
art. IV, § 13, reprinted in 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS: COLONIAL CHARTERS,
AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR
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constitutional provisions recognized broad objectives and did not prescribe
how these institutions of learning should encourage or promote the arts and
sciences. The Copyright Clause should enjoy this same breadth.
4.

“The Progress of Science” and Early Supreme Court Cases

The Supreme Court at one time flirted with the idea that the term “science”
in the Copyright Clause had some significant limiting force. In dicta in the
well-known case of Baker v. Selden,186 the Court quoted and cited with
approval language from Clayton v. Stone & Hall,187 a circuit court decision,
suggesting that there could be no copyright protection for a newspaper
reporting “the state of the market.”188 The language of Clayton cited the
Copyright Clause and noted that the purpose of the copyright act was the
promotion of science.189 Moreover,
it would certainly be a pretty extraordinary view of the sciences to consider a
daily or weekly publication of the state of the market as falling within any
class of of them. . . . The term “science” cannot, with any propriety, be applied
to a work of so fluctuating and fugitive a form as that of a newspaper or pricecurrent, the subject-matter of which is daily changing, and is of mere
temporary use.190

Based in part upon this interpretation of the Copyright Clause, the court in
Clayton concluded that the “price-current” or newspaper at issue could not be
considered a “book” within the meaning of the Copyright Act of 1790.191
Another theme in Clayton was that the price-current was an item of utility and
the result of the plaintiffs’ industry, but not a work of science, nor connected
with learning.192
Twelve years after Baker, in 1891, the Supreme Court in Higgins v.
Keuffel193 picked up on a similar theme when it held that mere product labels
could not qualify for copyright protection. Such labels, it reasoned, had no
value separate from the articles upon which they were attached, “and no
possible influence upon science or the useful arts.”194 The Court held that in

HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 801 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed.,
William S. Hein & Co. 1993) (1906) (“The arts and sciences shall be promoted, in one or more
seminaries of learning . . . .”).
186. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
187. 5 F. Cas. 999 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829) (No. 2,872).
188. Baker, 101 U.S. at 105–06.
189. Id. at 105 (quoting Clayton, 5 F. Cas. at 1003).
190. Id.
191. Clayton, 5 F. Cas. at 1003; accord Baker, 101 U.S. at 105–06 (quoting Clayton, 5 F. Cas.
at 1003).
192. Clayton, 5 F. Cas. at 1003.
193. 140 U.S. 428 (1891).
194. Id. at 431.
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order to qualify for copyright protection, an “article” had to serve “some
purpose other than as a mere advertisement.”195 Although Higgins can be
justified on the ground that the label lacked originality or contained
unprotectable ideas, the language of the opinion was not so limited. Higgins
suggested that copyrightability was dependent upon whether a particular work
seeking protection actually promoted the progress of science in some
identifiable manner.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in J.L. Mott Iron Works v. Clow,196
followed Baker and Higgins in holding that a price catalogue with illustrations,
dimensions, and price listings did not qualify for copyright protection because
it was a mere advertisement and, as such, failed to advance literature, science,
or art.197 The court noted that under the Constitution, Congress’s power was
“restricted to the promotion of the progress of science and useful arts.”198
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Courier Lithographing Co. v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co.,199 attempted to follow Higgins when it held that
chromolithographic prints created as advertising posters for a circus did not
qualify for copyright protection.200 The court held that with “no other use than
that of a mere advertisement, and no value aside from this function, it would
not be promotive of the useful arts, within the meaning of the constitutional
provision.”201 On appeal to the Supreme Court, Justice Holmes, in Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co.,202 reversed and put to rest the idea that pictures
used exclusively for advertisements were ineligible for copyright protection.203
Justice Holmes, while never mentioning Higgins, balked at the suggestion that
courts should or could do a qualitative analysis of the aesthetic or educational
value of works.204 Since Bleistein, the courts have not looked back.205

195. Id.
196. 82 F. 316 (7th Cir. 1897).
197. Id. at 321.
198. Id. at 320.
199. 104 F. 993 (6th Cir. 1900), rev’d sub nom. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.,
188 U.S. 239 (1903).
200. Courier Lithographing, 104 F. at 995–97.
201. Id. at 996; see also id. (“[H]aving no intrinsic value other than its function as an
advertisement, [it] must be equally without the obvious meaning of the constitution.”).
202. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
203. Id. at 251–52.
204. Id.; see also Griesedieck W. Brewery Co. v. Peoples Brewing Co., 56 F. Supp. 600, 606
(D. Minn. 1944) (contrasting Higgins with Bleistein and following Bleistein’s “more liberal
rule”).
205. See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345, 348 (1991) (not
necessarily construing the “to promote” phrase, but holding that the Constitution requires only a
very low level of creativity to qualify for copyright protection).
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CTEA: Promoting the Progress of Science

Under this broad view of the “to promote” phrase, the CTEA satisfies the
constitutional requirement. First, the CTEA directly relates to copyright
protection,206 and it leaves intact the basic protections and requirements of
copyright law. The 1976 Act, as amended by the CTEA, continues to provide
a system of incentives for the creation of works for limited times and permits,
within limits, public use of and access to those works.
Applying a more restrictive approach, which would require that the CTEA
itself promote the progress of science, the CTEA still survives scrutiny. It
harmonized United States copyright law with European Union law by
synchronizing the terms of many American and European copyrights. Under
an EU Council directive, member states were required to establish a copyright
term “for the life of the author and for 70 years after his death.”207 By
extending the term of American copyrights from the life of the author plus fifty
years to the life of the author plus seventy years,208 Congress believed it was
maintaining the United States as a leader in intellectual property protection and
consequently in creation of works.209 The statements made by members of
Congress and others emphasized this justification.210 The Register of
Copyrights, Marybeth Peters, in testimony before Congress strongly supported
passage of the CTEA211 and stated emphatically: “The Copyright Office
believes harmonization of the world’s copyright laws is imperative if there is
206. If a non-germane amendment, addressing an issue unrelated to copyright—say providing
crop subsidies—were attached to the Copyright Act, Congress would need to have authority for
that provision from some constitutional provision other than the Copyright Clause.
207. Council Directive 93/98/EEC, art. 1, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9 (EC).
208. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000).
209. This was not the first time Congress had relied upon this rationale for adopting copyright
legislation. In 1830, the House Report in support of the 1831 Act spoke of the need for the
United States to be “foremost among nations in encouraging science and literature” but lamented
that based on the term of copyright protection afforded in the United States, it was “very far
behind them all.” H.R. REP. No. 3, at 1 (1830), reprinted in U.S. Cong. Serial Set 210 (1830).
The report recommended passage of the bill extending the original term of copyright from
fourteen to twenty-eight years. Id. at 2.
210. See, e.g., The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 483 Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 4 (1995) [hereinafter S. Hearings] (statement of Sen.
Feinstein citing harmonization as “[p]erhaps the most compelling reason” for the CTEA); id. at 7,
20, 22 (statement of Register of Copyrights, Marybeth Peters, pointing to need to harmonize
copyright terms and need for United States to be a leader in copyright protection); S. REP. NO.
104–315, at 3 (1996) (Senate report stating reasons for the CTEA).
211. S. Hearings, supra note 210, at 22 (revealing that the Copyright Office “strongly
support[ed]” enactment of the CTEA). Perhaps Ms. Peters is having second thoughts. She
recently acknowledged that “the merits [of the CTEA] in terms of copyright principles were
slim.” Marybeth Peters, Copyright Enters the Public Domain: The 33rd Donald C. Brace
Memorial Lecture Delivered at New York University School of Law on Apr. 29, 2004, 51 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y USA 701, 710 (2004).
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to be an orderly exploitation of copyrighted works.”212 In the face of such
testimony it is difficult to find that Congress did not act reasonably to promote
the progress of science by enacting the CTEA.
The more relevant question is not whether implementing longer terms for
copyrights increased harmony with European law, but whether increasing
terms for existing copyrights either increased harmony with European law or
otherwise promoted the progress of science. The CTEA’s retroactive
extension of copyright terms is consistent with the European approach, which
also required retroactive extension of copyright terms.213 If harmonizing
United States copyright law with European law is a valid justification for the
CTEA, then it is a small step to find that harmonizing United States copyright
law with itself by synchronizing existing copyright terms with future copyright
terms is also valid justification. Testimony before Congress also supported a
finding that extension of existing copyrights would encourage investment in
restoration and public distribution of existing works with aged copyrights.214
C. Limits of the Copyright Clause
1.

Originality requirement

Article I, section 8, clause 8 empowers Congress to provide copyright and
patent protections, but it does impose some limits on Congress’s power to
legislate in the copyright area. Perhaps foremost is the requirement of
originality. Although originality is not expressly identified in the Copyright
Clause, courts have found the requirement implicit in the terms “authors” and
“writings.”215 In 1879, the “authors” and “writings” limitations were
controlling in The Trade-Mark Cases,216 where the Supreme Court held that
the Copyright Clause could not support trademark legislation because
trademarks were neither writings of authors nor discoveries of inventors.217
212. S. Hearings, supra note 210, at 20.
213. The EU directive required that the new copyright term applied to “all works” protected
in any Member State on July 1, 1995. Council Directive 93/98/EEC, arts. 10(2), 13, 1993 O.J. (L
290) 9 (EC); see also Written Question No. 841/98, 1998 O.J. (C 323) 82 (stating that art. 10(2)
requirement “has led to a resurrection of rights in some Member States”).
214. See Hatch & Lee, supra note 6, at 16–20 (discussing congressional testimony and this
justification).
215. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346–47 (1991); see also
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57–58 (1884) (defining author as “he to
whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker; one who completes a work of science or
literature” and holding that the Constitution is broad enough to cover photographs “so far as they
are representatives of original intellectual conceptions of the author”). The Eldred petitioners
argued that the originality requirement relates to the “promote the Progress of Science”
requirement. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 11, at 20–21.
216. 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
217. Id. at 93–94.
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During the same term, Baker v. Selden218 recognized that copyright
fundamentally did not extend to ideas or useful knowledge contained in
protected works.219 Shortly thereafter, in 1884, in Burrow-Giles Lithographics
Co. v. Sarony,220 the Supreme Court considered a constitutional question which
was “not free from difficulty”—whether photographs were writings of authors
within the meaning of the Copyright Clause.221 The Court concluded that
photographs could qualify “so far as they are representatives of original
intellectual conceptions of the author.”222 In 1891, in Higgins v. Keuffel,223 the
Court on constitutional grounds refused copyright protection for merely
descriptive ink bottle labels. The Court found that the labels lacked any value
as compositions and communicated nothing more than the contents of the
bottles.224 The holding in Higgins could be understood to mean that the labels
were not protectable because they lacked original expression.
More recently, in 1991, the Court in Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone
Service Co.225 enforced the originality requirement to hold that typical
telephone book white pages were not subject to copyright protection.226
Although the 1976 Act codifies the originality requirement,227 the courts
recognize that originality is a constitutional requirement.228
The Eldred petitioners, citing Feist, argued that extension of existing
copyrights violated the originality requirement.229 They argued that “whenever
congress extends to an ‘Author’ an ‘exclusive Right,’ that grant too must be
tested for originality.”230 Under this view, an existing work, already protected
by statutory copyright, could no longer be original for any subsequent
218. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
219. Baker does not clearly state that its holding was driven by the Copyright Clause. Baker,
however, quoted with approval language from Clayton v. Stone & Hall, 5 F. Cas. 999
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829), which explicitly relied upon the Copyright Clause. 101 U.S. at 105.
220. 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
221. Id. at 56.
222. Id. at 58. Other cases have discussed the originality requirement. See Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249–50 (1903) (discussing originality requirement);
Alfred Bell & Co., Ltd. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 101–03 (2d Cir. 1951) (discussing
originality requirement).
223. 140 U.S. 428 (1891).
224. Id. at 433.
225. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
226. Id. at 363–64.
227. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of
authorship”).
228. E.g., Feist Publ’ns, 499 U.S. at 346–47; Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111
U.S. 53, 58, 61 (1884); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 100–01 (2d Cir.
1951).
229. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 210 (2003); Brief for Petitioners, supra note 11, at
32–33.
230. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 11, at 33.
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copyright extension or grant. The theory appears to suggest that once a work
receives statutory copyright protection by virtue of being an original work, or
the work passes into the public domain for any reason, it has exhausted its
originality. This argument is inconsistent with the practice of the First
Congress when, under the authority of the Copyright Clause, it enacted the
1790 Act. The 1790 Act granted copyright protection to existing and even
Neither Congress nor the Framers recognized a
published works.231
constitutional problem by granting copyright protection to existing works or
works already protected by state copyrights.
The originality requirement is derivative of the “authors” and “writings”
requirements232 and should not be divorced from them or be permitted to
expand broadly, untethered from the text of the Copyright Clause. An
individual is genuinely an author when he or she includes an original
contribution (“creative spark”)233 as part of the work. That individual is no
less an author of the work with the passage of time, publication, or upon
procurement of statutory copyright protection; a work continues to be original
in the sense required by Feist. More fundamentally, changes to the scope or
term of existing copyrights should not require consideration of the originality
requirement. Any other rule would place copyright in a straitjacket, incapable
of any alteration after the interest first arose, and could lead to the specter of
multiple copyrights governed by different standards depending upon when a
copyright interest first arose. The Copyright Clause does not and should not
impose such a requirement.
2.

Limited Times Requirement

a.

Limited Times Copyrights in America: A Conscious Decision

Another limitation in the Copyright Clause, and of particular relevance to
Eldred v. Ashcroft, is the limited times restriction.234 At the time of the
framing of the Constitution, the idea of limited term copyrights had strong

231. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (1790); see also supra notes 150–63 and
accompanying text.
232. The Eldred petitioners argued that the originality requirement is based not only on
“authors” and “writings,” but also on the “promote the Progress of Science” requirement. Brief
for Petitioners, supra note 11, at 20–21; accord WALTERSCHEID, supra note 171, at 396–97
(originality standard of Feist incorporates creativity standard derived from the “to promote the
Progress of Science” clause).
233. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 211.
234. The Supreme Court has never invoked this limitation, but it has recognized it. See
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (acknowledging “limited
copyright duration required by the Constitution”); see also Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (1 Pet.)
1, 16–17 (1829) (patent case noting that the clause contemplates exclusive rights for a limited
period determined by Congress).
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historical precedent and support. Under the English copyright act, the Statute
of Anne of 1710, copyrights lasted for fourteen years from publication “and no
longer,”235 with the potential for an additional fourteen year renewal term if the
author was then living.236 When the Continental Congress called for state
copyright laws in 1783, it called for copyright protection “for a certain
time.”237 All the early state copyright laws were for limited terms.238
The fact that American statutory copyrights were for limited terms was not
by happenstance. The genesis of limited term copyrights likely was rooted in a
desire to avoid unnecessary monopolies in printing.239 Prior to the Statute of
Anne of 1710 in England, the Stationers’ Company, a powerful trade group
sanctioned by royal charter and legislation,240 created a system of private
perpetual copyrights.241 By this system of copyrights, the Stationers enjoyed a
powerful monopoly in the book trade. As part of the debate in the late
seventeenth century, John Locke complained about the impact of the
Stationers’ monopoly and advocated for, at most, limited term copyrights.
That any person or company should have patents for the sole printing of
ancient authors is very unreasonable and injurious to learning; and for those
who purchase copies from authors that now live and write, it may be
reasonable to limit their property to a certain number of years after the death of

235. Statute of Anne, 8 Ann., c.19, § I (1710) (Eng.).
236. Id. § XI.
237. 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 326–27 (Gaillard Hunt
ed., Government Printing Office 1922) (reporting text of resolution).
238. The terms varied. Most, like the Statute of Anne, provided for an original term of
fourteen years followed by a renewal term of fourteen years. See COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS,
supra note 55, at 1–21 (acts of Connecticut, Georgia, Maryland, New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvania, and South Carolina). Others varied from as short as fourteen years, id. at 15 (North
Carolina), to as long as twenty-one years, id. at 9, 14 (Rhode Island, Virginia).
239. Professor Thomas B. Nachbar rejects the position that the Copyright Clause reflected the
Framers’ alleged abhorrence of monopolies. See Nachbar, supra note 62, at 329–49. Professor
Nachbar’s thesis, however, focuses on the broader point that the Constitution does not evince a
generally applicable norm against grants of monopolies or exclusive rights. See id. The thesis
here is that the history of statutory copyright, dating back to the Statute of Anne, had
antimonopoly origins, and those origins carried through as a basis for copyright theory in
America. English statutory copyright law, spawned by the bad experience with the Stationers’
Company’s printing monopoly, coupled with Madison’s own undeniable distaste for monopolies,
likely were behind the “limited Times” phrase of the Copyright Clause.
240. See Licensing Act, 14 Car. 2, c. 33 (1662) (Eng.); 1 A TRANSCRIPT OF THE REGISTERS
OF THE COMPANY OF STATIONERS OF LONDON; 1554–1640 A.D., at xxviii–xxxii (Edward Arber
ed., Peter Smith 1950) (1875) [hereinafter TRANSCRIPT OF STATIONERS] (reproducing the text
and translation of the 1557 charter).
241. See generally Dallon, supra note 10, at 391–402 (discussing history of Stationers’
Company and its system of private copyright); 1 & 2 TRANSCRIPT OF STATIONERS, supra note
240 (providing history and records of the Stationers’ Company).
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the author, or the first printing of the book, as, suppose, fifty or seventy
years.242

Eventually, in 1694, Parliament refused to renew the Licensing Act, which had
allowed the Stationers to monopolize the book trade. The House of Commons
objected to renewal of the Licensing Act, because under the Act “said
Company are impowered to hinder the printing all innocent and useful Books,”
and printing of “the Classick Authors,” and “a great Number of the best
Books” had been “monopolized by the Company of Stationers.”243
Later, in 1710, Parliament enacted the Statute of Anne and terminated
perpetual copyrights for published works by imposing limited terms upon both
the existing private copyrights and future copyrights under the statute.244 The
Stationers continued to press their case for perpetual copyrights in the courts
until finally in 1774, the House of Lords rejected post-Statute of Anne
perpetual common law copyrights in Donaldson v. Beckett.245
Madison and Jefferson were opponents of monopolies, but Madison, for
his part, was willing to accept copyrights and patents as limited monopolies
necessary to encourage literary works and discoveries.246 Madison in his
correspondence with Jefferson in 1788 agreed that monopolies were “among
the greatest nusances [sic] in Government.”247 On a later occasion Madison
wrote that monopolies should only be “granted with caution, and guarded with
strictness against abuse.”248 Concerning copyrights and patents, however,
“[t]here can be no just objection to a temporary monopoly in these cases; but it
ought to be temporary because under that limitation a sufficient recompence
[sic] and encouragement may be given.”249 Supreme Court Justice and legal
scholar Joseph Story in 1833 explained that the public benefits from limited

242. LORD KING, THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOHN LOCKE 208 (Burt Franklin ed., Garland
Pubs. 1972) (1884).
243. 11 H.C. JOUR. 306 (1695).
244. Statute of Anne, 8 Ann., c.19, § I (1710) (Eng.) (providing a term of twenty-one years
for existing copyrights and two fourteen-year terms for future copyrights).
245. 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L. 1774). Donaldson held that even if a perpetual common law
copyright had existed, it was preempted by the Statute of Anne. Id. at 844–47.
246. See Letter from Madison to Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 1 THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS:
THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND JAMES MADISON 1776–1826, at
562, 566 (James Morton Smith ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 1995) (“With regard to Monopolies they
are justly classed among the greatest nusances [sic] in Government. But is it clear that as
encouragements to literary works and ingenious discoveries, they are not too valuable to be
wholly renounced?”).
247. Id.
248. James Madison, Aspects of Monopoly One Hundred Years Ago, 128 HARPER’S
MAGAZINE, March 1914, at 489, 490 (publishing Madison’s previously unpublished essay).
249. Id.
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term copyrights because “after a short interval,” the people have “full
possession and enjoyment” of the writings “without restraint.”250
Prior to the Constitution, the concept of perpetual copyright had been
advocated for in England. As late as 1774, in Donaldson v. Beckett,251
proponents of perpetual copyright were pressing their case. Noah Webster,
one of the early American advocates for copyright protection,252 preferred
perpetual copyrights. Several years after ratification of the Constitution,
Webster opined that he did “not see the reason why an interest in original
literary composition should stand on different ground from all other personal
property,” and he puzzled over why “[m]en are strangely influenced by habits”
into believing that property in literary compositions “should be held only for a
limited time, while a horse or an acre of land . . . is a permanent inheritable
estate.”253
The Framers, by including the “limited Times” phrase in the Copyright
Clause, unambiguously rejected the idea of perpetual statutory copyrights. In
the historical context where perpetual copyright was a familiar but rejected
concept, it was no surprise that the Framers accepted the prevailing view of the
time and opted for limited duration copyrights.
b.

Perpetual Copyright on “The Installment Plan”?

The petitioners in Eldred argued that the “blanket” term extension in the
CTEA for existing copyrights violated the limited times requirement.254
However, petitioners did not claim that the CTEA’s lengthened copyright
terms for works created in the future violated the limited times requirement.255
Rather, under petitioners’ view, only retroactive copyright term extensions
were suspect. The Court rejected the petitioners’ argument by resorting to the
dictionary definition of “limited” and Congress’s historical practice of
retroactive extensions.256

250. 3 STORY, supra note 91, § 1147.
251. 1 Eng. Rep. 847 (H.L. 1774).
252. Noah Webster was one of the first advocates for copyright protection in America.
Before the time of the Constitution he lobbied the individual states for copyright laws. See
HARRY R. WARFEL, NOAH WEBSTER: SCHOOLMASTER TO AMERICA 58 (1936) (“Webster
unquestionably is the father of copyright legislation in America.”).
253. Letter from Webster to Simeon Baldwin (Dec. 1803), in LETTERS OF NOAH WEBSTER,
supra note 149, at 253, 254; see also Letter from Webster to John Pickering (Dec. 1816), in
LETTERS OF NOAH WEBSTER, supra note 149, at 341, 383–86 (arguing that copyright is not a
monopoly, but property which should be for permanent enjoyment of author’s heirs).
254. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 11, at 18.
255. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 199 (2003) (“petitioners concede” that life plus 70
years for future copyrights qualifies as limited time); Brief for Petitioners, supra note 11, at 14
(“Whether 50 years is enough, or 70 years too much, is not a judgment meet for this Court.”).
256. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 199–204.
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Opponents of the CTEA and the Eldred petitioners both recognized the
danger with retroactive term extensions—perpetual copyrights on the
installment plan.257 Under the Court’s approach, a twenty-year extension of an
existing limited term is still “confine[d] within certain bounds.”258 The
problem is that under this view, any copyright term extension for a set number
of years would satisfy this requirement, and each time copyrights were about to
expire, Congress could tack on another extension with no clear end in sight.259
The Court acknowledged this risk, but noted that the CTEA did not present the
situation of a string of lengthy extensions attempting to avoid the limited times
requirement.260
The Court also found a lack of evidence that Congress intended the CTEA
as a step toward perpetual copyright.261 The challenge with this approach is
that it encourages unspoken motives; careful witnesses and legislators need
only pay lip service to the limited times requirement to avoid a constitutional
conflict. Members and witnesses may even speak supportively of perpetual
copyrights without causing a problem. The Court rejected Justice Breyer’s
dissenting citation to members of Congress who viewed the CTEA as a step in
the right direction toward perpetual copyright.262 In the Court’s view, these
“scattered statements” cited by Justice Breyer were not the sort of legislative
history “accord[ed] high value.”263
The EU Council directive requiring European Union member states to
adopt copyright terms for life of the author plus seventy years264 was a major
motivation—and for many the single most important motivation—for
congressional support of the CTEA.265 The EU directive lends strong support
257. In testimony before Congress, Professor Peter Jaszi warned that some might believe that
the CTEA “represents a downpayment on perpetual copyright on the installment plan.” S.
Hearing, supra note 210, at 72 (statement of Peter A. Jaszi).
258. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 199 (alteration in original) (quoting S. JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (7th ed. 1785)).
259. Professor Thomas Lee has picked up on this theme and analyzed his own hypothetical
“Marshall Mathers Copyright Term Extension Act of 2020,” which he forecasts undoubtedly will
be proposed in some form in the future. Thomas R. Lee, Eldred v. Ashcroft and the
(Hypothetical) Copyright Term Extension Act of 2020, 12 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 12 (2003).
He concludes that “[a]ll indications are that there will be a ‘next time,’” noting the powerful
lobbying interests behind the 1998 CTEA. Id. Professor Lee concludes that his best guess is that
such an extension of 30 years would likely survive a constitutional challenge under Eldred. Id. at
22.
260. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 208–09.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 209 n.16; see also id. at 256 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing members of Congress).
263. Id. at 209 n.16 (majority opinion).
264. Council Directive 93/98/EEC, art. 1, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9 (EC).
265. See, e.g., S. Hearings, supra note 210, at 4 (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein, a
cosponsor of the CTEA, that harmonization with European law was “[p]erhaps the most
compelling reason” for the CTEA); id. at 1–2 (statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, citing economic

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2006]

ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE

345

for the view that most members of Congress were not attempting to institute
perpetual copyright protection; instead, they were motivated by competitive
and economic concerns. Copyright terms for the life of the author plus seventy
years, and in the case of works made for hire for ninety-five or one hundred
and twenty years, are literally for limited times.
III. LIMITED JUDICIAL REVIEW FOR THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE
Applying an originalist approach, a court should consider both the
Framers’ intent concerning the Copyright Clause itself and their intent
regarding judicial review of congressional acts. To be true to the Framers’
intentions, there are two pertinent questions. First, would the Framers have
viewed the CTEA as consistent with the power granted by the Copyright
Clause? Second, assuming the CTEA is inconsistent with the grant in the
Copyright Clause, would the Framers have intended that a court strike down
the CTEA?
A.

Courts Read the Grant of Authority Under the Copyright Clause Broadly

In construing the Copyright Clause, the Supreme Court has read the clause
liberally,266 and Eldred is a continuation of the Court’s earlier precedents. In
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, the Court read the clause broadly to
hold that photographs were “writings” of “authors” within the constitutional
meaning of the clause.267 In Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.,268 the
Court held that “a mere advertisement”269 was subject to protection under the
Constitution and the prevailing copyright act.270 In Kalem Co. v. Harper
Brothers, the Court held that a movie dramatization of scenes depicted in the
novel Ben Hur infringed the plaintiff’s copyright and did not violate the
Copyright Clause by extending protection to ideas.271 In Mazer v. Stein, the

and trade disadvantages with Europe without the CTEA); ORRIN G. HATCH, COPYRIGHT TERM
EXTENSION ACT OF 1996, S. REP. NO. 104-315, at 3 (1996) (stating purpose of CTEA was “to
ensure adequate copyright protection for American works in foreign nations and the continued
economic benefits of a healthy surplus balance of trade in the exploitation of copyrighted works”
and citing “significant trade benefits” through harmonizing U.S. copyright law with European
law).
266. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 560, 561 (1973) (noting that terms “writings” and
“authors” “have not been construed in their narrow literal sense but, rather, with the reach
necessary to reflect the broad scope of constitutional principles”); Fargo Mercantile Co. v.
Brechet & Richter Co., 295 F. 823, 826 (8th Cir. 1924) (noting courts’ liberal construction of
Copyright Clause).
267. 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884).
268. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
269. Id. at 252 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
270. Id. (majority opinion).
271. 222 U.S. 55, 63 (1911).
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Supreme Court assumed, as did the parties, that the creator of a picture or a
statue was an “author” within the meaning of the Copyright Clause.272
These cases broadly construing the Copyright Clause are weighed against
the holdings enforcing limitations of the clause beginning with the Trade-Mark
Cases,273 Baker v. Selden,274 Higgins v. Keuffel,275 and more recently in Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.276 These cases are rooted in
the principle that copyright protection does not extend to ideas, facts, or other
works lacking originality. Yet, even these opinions in some measure signaled
a broad interpretation of the Copyright Clause. The Trade-Mark Cases
acknowledged that the word “writings” in the clause is “liberally construed.”277
Baker, although holding ideas beyond the reach of copyright protection,
recognized the basic doctrine that the copyright in a book is valid “without
regard to the novelty, or want of novelty, of its subject-matter.”278 In Feist, the
Court held that the constitutional requirement of originality is satisfied by only
an “extremely low” level of creativity, and emphasized that copyright
protection may exist for compilations of facts.279 These cases demonstrate that
the Court has construed the Copyright Clause liberally and implicitly afforded
broad discretion to Congress to legislate in the area of copyrights. Other courts
have followed the Supreme Court’s lead and have construed the language of
the Copyright Clause liberally. For example, courts have assumed, seemingly
without hesitation, that various works including computer programs, fabric
designs, belt buckles, and architectural structures are “writings” in the
constitutional sense.280

272. 347 U.S. 201, 208 (1954). But see id. at 219–21 (Douglas, J., concurring) (questioning
whether sculptor is an “author” or a statue a “writing,” and urging reargument to consider the
“important constitutional question”).
273. 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
274. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
275. 140 U.S. 428 (1891).
276. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
277. 100 U.S. at 94; accord Higgins, 140 U.S. at 431 (quoting Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at
94).
278. 101 U.S. at 102.
279. 499 U.S. at 345.
280. See, e.g., Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer Cal., 937 F.2d 759, 762–63 (2d Cir. 1991)
(recognizing and discussing copyright protection for fabric designs); Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1248 (3d Cir. 1983) (recognizing that computer
programs are afforded copyright protection as literary works); Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories By
Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 994 (2d Cir. 1980) (upholding copyright protection for ornamental belt
buckles); Yankee Candle Co. v. New England Candle Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 154, 158 (D. Mass.
1998) (recognizing copyright protection in architectural structures); see also United States v.
Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting “the term ‘Writings’ has been
interpreted so broadly as to include much more than writings in the literal sense, or the lay
definition of the word”).
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In Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,281 a case
cited by the Court in Eldred,282 the Court explained its position: “As the text of
the Constitution makes plain, it is Congress that has been assigned the task of
defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted to
authors . . . in order to give the public appropriate access to their work
product.”283 The Court has been willing to read the clause broadly and to
otherwise afford Congress flexibility when legislating in the area of copyrights.
The Court’s decision in Eldred is consistent with the Court’s historically
deferential approach to congressional copyright enactments; a stricter reading
of the Copyright Clause would have been a departure from the Court’s prior
cases.
B.

The Framers Intended Limited Judicial Review

There has been extensive debate over the scope, and early on even the
validity, of judicial review of congressional enactments. Although individual
Framers had many different views, it appears that the prevailing view among
the leading Framers was that the Constitution supported at least some level of
judicial review of congressional acts.284 Nevertheless, the early evidence
supports a practice of only limited, deferential judicial review of congressional
enactments. Professors Paul M. Schwartz and William Michael Treanor make
the case that under the Constitution generally, and the Copyright Clause in
particular, “the original understanding would be that the standard of judicial
review is a very deferential one,”285 and note that “the scholarly orthodoxy is

281. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
282. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 204–05 (2003).
283. 464 U.S. at 429; see also Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 230 (1990) (“[I]t is not our
role to alter the delicate balance Congress has labored to achieve.”); Goldstein v. California, 412
U.S. 546, 562 (1973) (noting that under the Copyright Clause “the area in which Congress may
act is broad”); Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 530 (1972) (patent case;
“The direction of Art. I is that Congress shall have the power to promote the progress of science
and the useful arts. When, as here, the Constitution is permissive, the sign of how far Congress
has chosen to go can come only from Congress.”).
284. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: ITS LEGAL AND
HISTORICAL BASIS AND OTHER ESSAYS 10–11 (reprint 1963) (1914) (identifying specific leading
Framers who understood the Constitution to provide for judicial review of congressional acts);
DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS
1789–1888, at 70 (1985) (noting that, at the Convention, members “recognized that the courts
would review the validity of congressional legislation”); SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW
AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 38–39 (1990) (noting limited discussion of judicial review
in the Constitutional Convention and concluding that of those who spoke about it, more supported
it than denied it).
285. Paul M. Schwartz & William Michael Treanor, Eldred and Lochner: Copyright Term
Extension and Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property, 112 YALE L.J. 2331, 2374
(2003).
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that the original understanding was that courts deferred to Congress and
legislatures unless a statute’s unconstitutionality was clear.”286
If what the Framers intended by the Copyright Clause is to be controlling
of its construction today, that intent must be taken in the broader context of
their views of judicial review. Understanding that the Framers intended only
very limited review over the constitutionality of congressional enactments, the
Supreme Court was correct in upholding the CTEA, which at a minimum does
not clearly violate the Copyright Clause.
IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE ELDRED RATIONALE
This Article takes the position that the outcome in Eldred likely did
comport with the original intentions of the Framers; the Framers intended that
Congress have broad discretion in enacting copyright laws and likely would
have approved even retroactive extension of copyrights to improve the
international competitive and economic position of the United States and its
copyright owners. The Eldred opinion also recognized the Court’s limited
constitutional role in review of copyright laws. That role permits the people’s
elected representatives to make policy decisions and pass laws with intrusion
only when absolutely necessary to enforce the people’s expressed will in the
Constitution.
The Eldred opinion, however, did open itself to some criticism. First, the
Court unnecessarily elevated the private interest rationale of copyright to a
status equal with the public interest rationale of copyright. Second, the Court
failed to reject outright the “quid pro quo” requirement suggested by the
petitioners. Third, the Court’s reliance on Congress’s history of copyright
extensions is problematic.
A.

The Public Interest Rationale for Copyright Protection

From the earliest history of copyright protection there have been two
competing rationales for copyright protection—a public interest rationale and a
private interest rationale.287 The public interest rationale focuses on benefits to
the public by encouraging availability of works to the public. The private
interest rationale focuses on benefits to individual authors or copyright holders.
In decisions prior to Eldred, the Court consistently reaffirmed the preeminence

286. Id. at 2371; see also Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 175 (1796) (Chase, J.)
(“[I]f the court have such power, I am free to declare, that I will never exercise it, but in a very
clear case.”); SNOWISS, supra note 284, at 36, 60 (noting that during the period prior to Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), judicial review was “reserved for the concededly
unconstitutional act”).
287. See generally Dallon, supra note 10 (discussing public interest and private interest
rationales).
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of the public interest rationale for copyrights.288 In Feist Publications, Inc. v.
Rural Telephone Service Co., the Court stated that “[t]he primary objective of
copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but ‘[t]o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts.’”289 In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., the Court stated: “The monopoly privileges that Congress may
authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special
private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an important
public purpose may be achieved.”290 In United States v. Paramount Pictures,
Inc., the Court recognized that “copyright law . . . makes reward to the owner a
secondary consideration.”291 These pronouncements are consistent with the
language of the Copyright Clause itself, which explicitly focuses on the public
benefits of copyright protection in its “To promote the Progress of Science”
language.292 The 1790 Act also focused on the public interest rationale.293
Adoption of the public interest rationale by the Framers and the First
Congress likely was a calculated decision. The state copyright acts adopted
from 1783 to 1786 had a strong flavor of the private interest rationale,294 but
the Framers chose not to include any reference to the private interest rationale
in the Constitution. The 1790 Act is likewise devoid of reference to the private
interest rationale.
Eldred in lengthy footnote 18 is critical of the dissenters’ reliance upon the
The opinion claims that Justice Stevens
public interest rationale.295
“understates” the relationship between reward to authors and the progress of
science, and Justice Breyer “misses the mark” when he asserts that “copyright

288. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 519–20 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(primary purpose is not to reward authors; private motivation must promote public availability of
works); Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 524–26 (1994) (copyright must ultimately serve
public good); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“[P]rivate
motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature,
music, and the other arts.”); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (reward to copyright
owners is secondary); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (“The sole interest of
the United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits
derived by the public from the labors of authors.”).
289. 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991).
290. 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
291. 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948).
292. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
293. The Act was entitled “An Act for the encouragement of learning . . . .” Copyright Act of
1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790).
294. For example, the Connecticut copyright statute stated: “[I]t is perfectly agreeable to the
principles of natural equity and justice, that every author should be secured in receiving the
profits that may arise from the sale of his works . . . .” COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note 55,
at 1. The North Carolina copyright statute began: “Whereas nothing is more strictly a man’s own
than the fruit of his study . . . .” Id. at 15.
295. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003).
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statutes must serve public, not private, ends.”296 According to the Court,
“copyright law celebrates the profit motive,”297 and “[r]ewarding authors” and
promoting progress are “complementary.”298 Finally, the Court concluded, the
public end and the private end “are not mutually exclusive.”299
The Court also found that the CTEA enjoyed a rational basis and promoted
the progress of science in part because of demographic, economic, and
technological changes, and because “longer terms would encourage copyright
holders to invest in the restoration and public distribution of their works.”300
The demographic, economic, and technological changes argument at heart is
only a private interest justification. The argument was that in view of
increased human longevity and the pattern of starting families later in life, the
term life plus fifty years did not adequately provide for an author’s
descendants.301 This argument, although framed in terms of increased
incentives for authors to create works, had little to do with incentives302 and
much to do with the private interests of maintaining revenue streams to nonauthor copyright successors.303 One is hard pressed to claim that by
retroactively lengthening the term of an existing copyright, there is an
increased incentive to the author of the existing work (who may or may not
continue to be the copyright holder).
Encouraging restoration and public distribution of existing works, on the
other hand, would serve the public interest rationale. The difficulty is that the
forces behind the CTEA had in mind preventing restoration and public
distribution of copyrighted works by petitioners and others. Also, this
argument would support perpetual copyright; a copyright holder will always
have greater incentive to invest in a work so long as the copyright monopoly
continues. Of course lengthening copyright terms does not necessarily
encourage public distribution of works. In some situations it could encourage
a copyright holder to sit on a work and wait, knowing that the renewed
copyright protection will prevent others from exploiting the work first.

296. Id.
297. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1,
27 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d, 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994)).
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 206–07; see also id. at 213 (identifying justifications for concluding
that CTEA promoted the progress of science).
301. Id. at 207 n.14.
302. See Dallon, supra note 10, at 447–53 (arguing that CTEA has no significant impact on
incentives to create works).
303. See id. at 442–44 (citing testimony before Congress seeking income for authors’
descendants); id. at 443–46 (arguing that increased life expectancy and providing for three
generations are not valid justification for copyright term extension).
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The Court further diminished the distinction between the public interest
and the private interest in another troublesome footnote when it cited testimony
of the Register of Copyrights.304 The Court stated:
According to the Register, extending the copyright for existing works
“could . . . provide additional income that would finance the production and
publication of new works.” “Authors would not be able to continue to create,”
the Register explained, “unless they earned income on their finished works.
The public benefits not only from an author’s original work but also from his
or her further creations.”305
Under this view, anything that puts money in the pockets of copyright
holders promotes the progress of science.306 This is not accurate. For many
extended copyrights, the authors are dead and will not be creating any new
works regardless of continued revenue to their estates or copyright successors;
assuring continued payments to George Gershwin’s grandchildren does not
promote the public interest. Moreover, for those living authors who continue
to hold their copyrights, the additional financial value of twenty years tacked
onto an already lengthy copyright period is likely next to nothing.307 The large
majority of works do not retain significant economic value for more than fifty
years from the death of the author, and adding twenty years to the term
changes nothing for those works.308
The Court’s private interest-oriented arguments were unnecessary and risk
eroding the public interest rationale of copyright. The Court could have
avoided this problem by adopting the view urged above—that the Copyright
Clause does not require judicial scrutiny of each copyright amendment for
compliance with the “to promote” phase so long as the overall copyright
scheme complies with the requirement.309 Alternatively, the Court should have

304. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 207–08 n.15.
305. Id. at 208 n.15 (citations omitted).
306. For example, tax cuts or grants to entertainment companies would “promote the Progress
of Science.”
307. Professor John Belton testified before Congress that corporations making movies and
television programs “operate on a short-term financial basis” and need to make their money on a
work within two to five years from release. Copyright Term, Film Labeling, and Film
Preservation Legislation: Hearing on H.R. 989, H.R. 1248, and H.R. 1734 Before the Subcomm.
on Courts and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 286 (1995)
(statement of John Belton, Professor, Rutgers University, on behalf of the Society for Cinema
Studies). “Any profit that it generates after its initial play-off is pure gravy and has little or no
relation to the initial incentives which led to its production.” Id.; see also S. Hearings, supra note
210, at 72 (Professor Peter A. Jaszi stated: “No rational business makes economic decisions about
present investment based on the mere possibility of income 75 or 100 years in the future.”).
308. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 248 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Congressional Research
Service study finding that only 2% of copyrights between 55 and 75 years old retain commercial
value).
309. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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maintained that the CTEA itself does promote the progress of science. Under
the Copyright Clause and our legal tradition, the public interest and private
interest are not co-equal interests and never have been. The private interest is
only relevant to the extent that it furthers the public interest. To the extent that
the CTEA was intended to provide for the grandchildren of now-dead authors,
a private interest is served, but not a public interest. However, in the case of
the CTEA, the Act served both private and public interests. By harmonizing
United States copyright law with European Union copyright law, the CTEA
serves the public interest required by the Copyright Clause; it promotes the
progress of science by encouraging efficiencies and maintaining the United
States as a leader in copyright protection.310 This in turn encourages American
authors to create works in the United States and seek American copyright
protection. Retroactive extension of copyrights less clearly promotes the
progress of science, but seems to be a reasonable adjustment to copyright law,
internally harmonizing United States copyright terms. Also, even retroactive
extensions may serve to encourage authors of future works who sense that
American copyright law is favorable to authors. This prevents potential
authors from shifting their creative efforts to other countries, which might be
perceived as offering more favorable copyright protections.
B.

Quid Pro Quo: Really?

The Eldred opinion should not have assumed, for purposes of the opinion,
the petitioners’ argument that the Copyright Clause “imbeds a quid pro quo”
applicable to the CTEA.311 The quid pro quo argument was that Congress can
only grant copyright protection in exchange for a writing by an author.312 By
assuming the correctness of the proposition, the Court had to stretch to find
that in fact copyright holders did give something in exchange for retroactive
term extension. The Court concluded that when authors of existing works
created their works, they did so in exchange for both the then-existing
copyright protection and any future extensions.313 Part of that original bargain
was a legitimate expectation that the authors—or more aptly their successors—
would be entitled to any future extensions.314 This expectation became part of
the incentive to authors by virtue of Congress’s “unbroken practice.”315 The
310. The fact that the CTEA improves the United States’ international trading position also
serves a public interest, albeit not the public interest envisioned by the Copyright Clause. The
public interest purpose of the Copyright Clause requires that copyright law “promote the Progress
of Science.” This purpose has nothing to do with the balance of trade between nations, but has to
do with the advancement of knowledge or the spread of learning.
311. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 11, at 23.
312. Id.
313. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 214–15.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 215.
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Court also noted that standard copyright assignment agreements envision such
possible extensions.316
The Court’s analysis on this point is not persuasive. There is nothing
remotely approaching consideration317 for the retroactive extension. When an
author receives copyright protection there is no commitment or expectation of
any copyright extension.318 Would an author who created a work in 1978 have
had an expectation that the term of his or her copyright would be extended?
Does an author who creates a work today have a reasonable expectation that
his or her copyright term will be extended in the future? If so, then there
would be a serious “limited Times” issue with the CTEA and a genuine risk of
perpetual copyright “on the installment plan.”
Not only are future extensions generally speculative, but there is no
requirement or moral imperative that any future term extensions be made
retroactive. Whether an extension is retroactive is completely at the discretion
of Congress. The Court unwisely suggested that Congress “as a matter of
unbroken practice” has given authors the equivalent of “an express guarantee
that authors would receive the benefit of any later legislative extension of the
copyright term.”319 Prior legislative practices are not binding on future
congresses320 and no reasonable author could expect otherwise. When an
author creates (or “gives”) his or her work, any exchange is for the rights
afforded under then-existing copyright law. Whatever additional rights
Congress thereafter chooses to afford the copyright holder are bonuses and
separate from the inducement. The fact that standard copyright assignment
agreements routinely acknowledge the fortuity of a retroactive legislative
extension321 indicates only good lawyering in providing broadly for possible
future events.
The hope of retroactive term extensions, completely optional at the will of
Congress, as part of the original inducement for authors is analogous to the
contract law classic illusory promise. In contract law, a promise of
performance may be consideration for a return performance, but a purported
promise that is optional with the promisor is no promise at all and does not
316. Id. at 215 n.21.
317. The Court uses the word “consideration” in its discussion. Id. at 214. The petitioners
consistently made reference to a required “exchange.” See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 11, at
16 n.5, 23.
318. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2(1) (1981) (“A promise is a
manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a
promisee in understanding that a commitment has been made.”).
319. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 215.
320. See United States v. Windstar, 518 U.S. 839, 871–73 (1996) (discussing and accepting
entrenchment doctrine); Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate:
Entrenchment and Retroactivity, 12 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 379 (1987) (recognizing and
discussing rationale for entrenchment doctrine).
321. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 215 n.21.
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constitute consideration.322
The optional retroactive extension is not
consideration for the work and the work cannot be consideration for a future
optional extension.
Instead of reaching to find an exchange, the Court should have held that
the Copyright Clause does not impose a quid pro quo requirement. As
authority for this requirement, the petitioners cited two patent cases: Pennock
v. Dialogue and Brenner v. Manson.323 Pennock only invoked the “quid pro
quo” argument in determining the probable intent of Congress under the patent
act, without reference to construction of the Intellectual Property Clause.324
Brenner stated that the “quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution and the
Congress for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public
But Brenner involved
from an invention with substantial utility.”325
interpretation and application language of the patent act, not the limits of
Congress’s constitutional powers.326 There is no reason to believe that the
Framers, by the Copyright Clause, intended a quid pro quo analysis for each
amendment of copyright law.
C. History of Copyright Extensions
The Eldred opinion relied heavily upon the “unbroken congressional
practice” of extending terms of existing copyrights when prospective copyright
terms are extended.327 Although historical practice is significant, the Court
may have overstated the argument.
The historical rationale is twofold. First, conduct of the earliest congresses
speaks directly to the meaning of the Constitution. Second, longstanding
accepted practices otherwise are entitled to some deference. The Court
followed its long line of cases holding that actions of the early congresses
speak to the meaning of the Constitution and to the intent of the Framers.328
322. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 cmt. e (1981) (stating that “[w]ords of
promise which by their terms make performance entirely optional with the ‘promisor’ . . . do not
constitute a promise”); id. at § 77 (discussing illusory promises).
323. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 11, at 8 (citing Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.)
1 (1829), and Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966)).
324. See Pennock, 27 U.S. at 22–23.
325. Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534.
326. Id.; see also McClurg v. Kinsland, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 202, 206 (1843) (stating that
retroactive changes to the patent law were valid, noting “the powers of Congress to legislate upon
the subject of patents is plenary by the terms of the Constitution . . . there can be no limitation of
their right to modify them at their pleasure”).
327. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 200–04 (2003).
328. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673–74 (1984) (looking to the conduct of the First
Congress as evidence of the meaning of Establishment Clause and noting that seventeen
draftsmen of the Constitution were members of the First Congress); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S.
783, 790 (1983) (holding that “historical evidence sheds light not only on what the draftsmen
intended . . . but also on how they thought that Clause applied to the practice authorized by the
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Of particular significance is Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,329
which construed the meaning of “writings” and “authors” of the Copyright
Clause to include photographs. The Court interpreted the words of the clause
in light of the 1790 Act and 1802 amendments to the Act, noting the early
congresses’ broad view of writings to include maps, charts, etchings,
engravings, and prints supported a broad interpretation of the Copyright
Clause.330 The Court repeated the now familiar principle:
The construction placed upon the Constitution by the first act of 1790 and
the act of 1802, by the men who were contemporary with its formation, many
of whom were members of the convention which framed it, is of itself entitled
to very great weight, and when it is remembered that the rights thus established
have not been disputed during a period of nearly a century, it is almost
conclusive.331

This principle applies to the First Congress and to other early congresses that
included members of the founding generation, but cannot claim the same force
as it concerns later, if now distant, congresses whose members were not
involved with the framing or ratification of the Constitution.332
The 1790 Act did not retroactively extend existing copyrights; it created
for the first time federal copyrights. Although the 1790 Act does not directly

First Congress—their actions reveal their intent”); Hampton v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 353
(1928) (explaining that “a contemporaneous legislative exposition of the Constitution when the
founders of our government and framers of our Constitution were actively participating in public
affairs long acquiesced in fixes the construction to be given its provisions”); Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52, 175 (1926) (affirming practice of affording “greatest weight” to
constitutional interpretation of First Congress); Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 297
(1888) (holding enactment of First Congress “is contemporaneous and weighty evidence of [the
Constitution’s] true meaning”); Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803) (holding that
practice and acquiescence from organization of judiciary fixed the construction of constitutional
provision); see also Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 681 (1970) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (stating that “[t]he existence from the beginning of the Nation’s life of a practice . . .
is not conclusive of its constitutionality[, b]ut such practice is a fact of considerable import in the
interpretation of abstract constitutional language”); United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008,
1011–12 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (relying heavily upon practices acquiesced in by the Framers
in interpreting scope of recess appointment power under the Constitution); James v. Watt, 716
F.2d 71, 76–77 (1st Cir. 1983) (stating that “[t]he views and actions of the first Congress . . . are
entitled to considerable weight in cases like this of constitutional interpretation”). But see Walz,
397 U.S. at 678 (majority opinion) (explaining that “no one acquires a vested or protected right in
violation of the Constitution by long use, even when that span of time covers our entire national
existence and indeed predates it”).
329. 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
330. Id. at 57–58.
331. Id. at 57.
332. See Walterscheid, supra note 8, at 339 (arguing that actions of Congress in 1831 do not
qualify for the great weight afforded to earlier congresses that included members of the founding
generation). But see infra notes 341–45 and accompanying text.
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speak to retroactive copyright extension, it does establish that the First
Congress did not understand the Constitution to prohibit affording copyright
protection to existing, published works.333 The 1790 Act undermines the
Eldred petitioners’ arguments that retroactive term extensions do not promote
the progress of science and violate a perceived quid pro quo.334
The first copyright term extension of general application335 occurred in the
Act of February 3, 1831 (the “1831 Act”).336 The 1831 Act extended the terms
of existing copyrights to bring them in harmony with the new, longer copyright
term afforded to new works under the Act.337 Both the 1909 Act338 and the
1976 Act339 likewise extended the terms of existing copyrights. The later two
of these three extensions, however, were not enacted by congresses containing
Framers, and their constitutional interpretations do not necessarily reflect on
the Framers’ intent.340
The Twenty-first Congress, which enacted the 1831 Act, may accurately
claim familiarity with the Framers’ and Ratifiers’ intentions because it
contained several members of that generation. This Congress had twenty-five
members who were born in 1770 or earlier and would have been sixteen or
older when the Constitution was written in 1787.341 One of its members,
Senator Samuel Smith from Maryland, was born in 1752, fought in the
Revolutionary War, and was thirty-five when the Constitution was written.342
Congressman John Roane from Virginia, born in 1766, was himself a delegate
to Virginia’s constitutional convention in 1788.343 Senator James Iredell, Jr.,

333. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 213 n.19 (2003).
334. See Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124; 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
FIRST CONGRESS, supra note 151, at 30, 34–36 (explaining that the early authors and the First
Congress understood the Copyright Clause to grant copyright protection to existing, published
works).
335. Congress did pass two acts continuing the copyright of John Rowlett in a work. See Act
of May 24, 1828, ch. 145, 6 Stat. 389; Act of Feb. 11, 1830, ch. 13, 6 Stat. 403.
336. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436.
337. See id. at ch. 16, § 16.
338. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, §§ 23, 24, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080–81.
339. Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 304, 90 Stat. 2573, 2573–74.
340. This history of retroactive extensions may speak to the policies of settled expectations
and stability.
341. See Biographical Directory of the United States Congress 1774–Present, http://
bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/biosearch1.asp (last visited Oct. 30, 2005); see also
BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 1774–1989, at 108–10
(Bicentennial ed., 1989) (listing members of the 21st Congress and publishing their biographies).
342. A BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 1774–1989, supra
note 341, at 1837. Senator Asher Robbins from Rhode Island who was born in 1757 and
graduated from Yale in 1782 would have been almost thirty when the Constitution was written.
Id. at 1723.
343. Id. at 1723.
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from North Carolina, was the son of Justice James Iredell344 who, in addition
to being an original member of the Supreme Court, was a leading Federalist in
North Carolina and instrumental in achieving ratification of the Constitution in
North Carolina.345
The extensions afforded by these three acts also might be distinguishable
from the CTEA because each of them involved the repeal of predecessor
copyright acts and were general copyright law revisions. They were not
primarily copyright term extensions. Each act, as a whole, could be viewed as
promoting the progress of science and serving the public interest. The CTEA
was different; it was not a comprehensive copyright law revision. Its primary
purpose was to extend the term of copyrights.
The view that longstanding practices otherwise should be entitled to
deference is not persuasive. Longevity of a practice alone, particularly where a
constitutional challenge had never before been considered, should not define
the reach of the Constitution.346 Interpreting the meaning of the Constitution
based on the conduct of Congress undermines judicial review and diminishes
the force of the Constitution.
V. CONCLUSION
Eldred v. Ashcroft presented a limited question: whether Congress had
exceeded its constitutional powers by extending the terms of existing
copyrights. The case was not about whether a term of the life of an author plus
seventy years violated the limited times requirement, nor was it about whether
copyright term extension was prudent. The Court correctly held that Congress
did not exceed its constitutional powers. Applying an originalist or historical
approach to constitutional interpretation, the Copyright Clause is first and
foremost a grant of power. The clause permits Congress, at its discretion, to
enact laws to create and protect copyright interests and imposes only modest
limitations on Congress. These limitations include the originality and limited
times requirements.
The phrase “To promote the Progress of Science” should be understood
broadly to empower Congress to make changes to copyright law that Congress
rationally believes improve the overall copyright scheme. The phrase should
not be understood to impose a test for each germane amendment to copyright
law. To the extent that the phrase is viewed as a test for each copyright
344. WILLIS P. WHICHARD, JUSTICE JAMES IREDELL, at xiv (2000) (noting that James Jr. was
born in 1788).
345. See id. at 45–52 (discussing Iredell’s influence with North Carolina’s delegates to the
Constitutional Convention and efforts to secure ratification in North Carolina).
346. See L. Ray Patterson, What’s Wrong with Eldred? An Essay on Copyright
Jurisprudence, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 345, 349 (2003) (criticizing Court’s tactic of using practice
of Congress to define Constitution rather than measuring practice of Congress against language of
Constitution).
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amendment, it should not impose a limited understanding requiring creation or
publication of new works.
The Eldred decision, not surprisingly, read the grant of authority under the
Copyright Clause broadly and afforded Congress great deference to legislate in
the area of copyrights. The decision is consistent with the Court’s prior
copyright cases that indulged in liberal construction of the Copyright Clause
and allowed Congress substantial latitude to establish copyright policy. The
approach also is consistent with the Framers’ view of the appropriate role of
the courts in reviewing congressional enactments.
Unfortunately, the decision may be understood by some as demoting the
public interest rationale for copyrights in favor of a private interest rationale.
The Court need not have backed away from the public interest rationale, but
instead should have emphasized how even retroactive extensions would serve
the public interest.
The seeming irony of the CTEA’s retroactive copyright term extension is
that rather than increasing public access to works by encouraging creation or
publication, instead, the CTEA discouraged publication and dissemination of
existing, protected works by individuals and entities like the Eldred petitioners.
Copyright should “increase and not . . . impede the harvest of knowledge,”347
but Congress reasonably may have believed that retroactive extension created
an incentive for copyright holders to exploit and publish their works in new
media and to preserve their works for future exploitation. Congress also may
have believed that by maintaining the United States as an international leader
of copyright protection, creators of future works would be encouraged to create
works governed by American copyright law rather than opting to create works
abroad.
The Court in Eldred should have rejected the position that the Copyright
Clause requires a “quid pro quo” rather than stretch to find “an exchange”348
between authors of previously copyrighted works and the United States. The
hope of being the beneficiary of possible future copyright extensions is so
tenuous that it cannot be considered the basis for any exchange. Nothing in the
language or history of the Copyright Clause imposes a quid pro quo
requirement for amendments to copyright law.
Finally, the Court’s reliance on the “unbroken congressional practice” of
Congress, while appropriate to a point, is not as compelling as it might first
appear. The 1790 Act did not retroactively extend existing copyrights. The
other extensions cited by the Court occurred several decades or more after
ratification of the Constitution. Particularly, the unchallenged extensions in
the 1909 and 1976 Acts do not speak to the intentions of the Framers. The
1831 Act may have more interpretive significance, but it too was more than
347. Harper & Row, Pubs., Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 545 (1985).
348. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 214 (2003).
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four decades removed from the framing and ratification of the Constitution.
The three major retroactive extensions were temporally separated by many
decades; they were not frequently recurring events. Moreover, the CTEA
could be distinguished from those prior extensions. It stands alone as an
amendment to an existing copyright act rather than an extension which was
part of a comprehensive revision of copyright law.
The Framers and ratifiers of the Constitution wanted to clarify that
Congress had the power to grant copyrights, which they believed would be
good for the United States society and economy. Had they been faced with the
opportunity to maximize profits of American copyright holders, improve the
United States balance of trade, and place the United States on par with
European copyright protections, there can be little doubt what they would have
done, even understanding their desire for limited term copyrights. Any other
outcome in Eldred would have been contrary to the Copyright Clause as
defined by the intentions of those who wrote and ratified it and would have
imposed a policy decision not supported by elected representatives or required
by the Constitution.
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